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THE IDEA OF “TOO MUCH LAW” 
Mila Sohoni*
 
 
If brevity is the soul of wit, what is verbosity the soul of?  Of 
overweening, inefficient, even tyrannical government—at least according to 
the critics who, for years, have bewailed the fact that federal laws and 
regulations are growing by the minute, by the mile, and by the metric ton.  
These critics argue that America suffers from “hyperlexis,” or the existence 
of too much law, and their calls for remedies to that malady are now 
finding a receptive ear in the highest echelons of the federal government.  
The idea that there is too much federal law has been embraced by all three 
branches of government and by members of both major political parties. 
In order to analyze these claims, this Article taxonomizes and evaluates 
the most common claims of hyperlexis in federal law, including the claims 
that federal laws and regulations are too numerous, too complex, too 
costly, and too invasive of state and local prerogatives.  Once these 
arguments are untangled, their individual flaws become evident.  Almost 
each account of federal hyperlexis faces serious conceptual obstacles in 
either its technique for measuring hyperlexis or in its method for remedying 
it. 
This Article then notes one argument that has not been convincingly 
made:  the argument that the proliferation of federal law results from a 
democratic failure.  No public choice account plausibly explains the 
persistent and widespread overgrowth of law.  But the absence of such an 
account cannot, of course, put a stake through the heart of the hyperlexis 
critique, which implicates deeply embedded philosophical beliefs 
concerning the nature of individual liberty and the proper role of 
government.  The critique represents a challenge to the legitimacy of law 
that current theories of law’s legitimacy are not oriented to deflect.  We are 
left, then, in the worst of both worlds.  The hyperlexis critique does not map 
out a means to achieve the goal of reducing the amount of federal law, but 
the currency of the critique has corrosive effects upon the sociological 
legitimacy of federal law and institutions. 
 
 
 
 
*  Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law.  Many thanks to Adam 
Benforado, Chris Egleson, Richard Fallon, Daryl Levinson, Peter Schuck, J.B. Ruhl, David 
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for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to Brian Levy for excellent research 
assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thousands of pages of statutes and millions of pages of regulations are 
smothering America’s economy and killing its spirit.1  Permits and 
paperwork cost businesses billions or even trillions of dollars annually.2  
Regulations are excessively burdensome, too intrusive, and sometimes “just 
plain dumb.”3  Some bodies of law are so complex that even federal judges 
claim not to understand them.4  Though the country is “drowning” in law 
already,5
 
 1. See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, Drowning in Law:  A Flood of Statutes, Rules and 
Regulations Is Killing the American Spirit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2010, at 36. 
 it will soon be deluged by a “regulatory tsunami” of historic 
 2. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
ADVOCACY, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 2–3 (Sept. 2010), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs371tot.pdf (discussing estimates of the 
“annual cost” of federal regulations ranging from $51 billion to over $1 trillion). 
 3. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 18, 2011, at A17. 
 4. See Richard Lazarus, Complex Laws Can’t Spell Judicial Respect, ENVTL. F., Jan.–
Feb. 2005, at 8, 8 (describing judicial antipathy to environmental law claims because of their 
technical and scientific nature, as well as their dense jargon). 
 5. See Howard, supra note 1. 
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scale.6  Some regulations are a “clear and present danger” to the national 
security of the United States and, if they came from a foreign power, 
“would rightly be considered an act of war.”7
It is impossible to open a newspaper without seeing some such version of 
the claim that America suffers from “hyperlexis,” or the existence of “too 
much law.”
 
8  Especially since the 2008 financial crisis, one variant of the 
idea of hyperlexis has become a commonplace feature of public debate:  the 
perception that the inexorable growth of federal statutory and regulatory 
law has reached an unacceptable level.9  In the wake of the global liquidity 
crunch, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the threat of bankruptcy at 
AIG,10 the country was riveted by several dramatic and perhaps 
unavoidable government interventions in the financial and economic 
markets.  These interventions included the United States Treasury’s 
creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program,11 the Treasury’s purchase of 
preferred stock in “too big to fail” financial institutions,12
 
 6. Thomas J. Donohue, President & CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The 
Regulatory Tsunami—How a Tidal Wave of Regulations Is Drowning America (Oct. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2010/regulatory-tsunami-
how-tidal-wave-regulations-drowning-america. 
 the Federal 
 7. See Editorial, An EPA Moratorium, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2011, at A16. 
 8. Bayless Manning coined the term “hyperlexis” in a law review article published in 
1977. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis:  Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 
(1977) (“Hyperlexis is America’s national disease—the pathological condition caused by an 
overactive law-making gland.”).  Most subsequent discussion of hyperlexis has focused on 
the alleged excesses of lawsuits and lawyers, rather than on law per se. See, e.g., Simon A. 
Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect:  Media and Litigation 
Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1341–42 (2009) (asserting that “hyperlexis” 
is another word for the “litigation explosion”); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of 
Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly 
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 6 (1983) (examining “one 
component of the hyperlexis syndrome—the alleged high rates of disputing and litigation—
in the context of current research”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are 
the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in 
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985 (2003) (similar). 
 9. See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.  Ironically, the 2008 crisis was an 
economic cataclysm that many (including some prominent conservatives) argued was caused 
by too little law, not too much. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM:  THE 
CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xii (2009) (arguing that “[t]he 
movement to deregulate the financial industry went too far,” the economic crisis “is a market 
failure” and that “a more active and intelligent government” is needed to prevent future 
problems).  The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 has often been blamed for the 
crisis. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge 
Fund Industry:  Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 
359, 385 (2009) (“[T]he present financial crisis begins with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act . . . .”). 
 10. See POSNER, supra note 9, at viii–ix. 
 11. Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101–136, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3767–3800 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 12. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital 
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx (announcing that the Treasury would buy up to $250 billion in 
preferred shares from qualifying banks). 
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Reserve’s purchase of over $1 trillion in mortgage-backed securities,13 the 
bailout of troubled automakers Chrysler and General Motors,14 and the 
federal conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.15
During roughly the same period, the Obama Administration pressed 
forward on plans to overhaul the nation’s health insurance market and to 
regulate consumer finance transactions.  In 2010, these efforts resulted in 
the passage of two enormous pieces of law—the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act
 
16 (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act17 (Dodd-Frank)—each of which obviously 
required extensive new regulations.18
The federal government’s rescue efforts and the new laws contributed to 
an increased public perception of excessive government intervention in the 
markets and in the decisions of private actors.  The emergence in early 2009 
of a loosely organized movement known as the Tea Party either produced,
 
19 
or was a product of,20 an increase in rhetoric about government 
intrusiveness.  By late 2009, public opinion polls showed a resurgence in 
the percentage of Americans saying that the government is trying to do “too 
many things” and that the federal government has “too much power.”21
 
 13. FAQs:  MBS Purchase Program, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mbs_faq.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
  
 14. Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
financial-stability/programs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (describing the 
Bush and Obama Administrations’ automobile manufacturer bailout). 
 15. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. 
Lockhart 5–6 (Sept. 7, 2008),  http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement
9708final.pdf (announcing conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
 17. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
 18. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS 
PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA), at Summary 
(2010), available at http://geoffdavis.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Regulations_Pursuant_to_
the_Patient_Protection.pdf (noting that the report identifies “more than 40 provisions in 
PPACA . . . that require, permit, or contemplate rulemaking by federal agencies to 
implement the legislation”); CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41380, THE 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:  REGULATIONS TO BE 
ISSUED BY THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 3 (2010) [hereinafter COPELAND, 
DODD-FRANK], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41380.pdf (noting that one 
source says that Dodd-Frank requires “a total of 243 ‘rulemakings’” while another “placed 
the number of rules expected to be issued pursuant to the act even higher”). 
 19. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Tea Party Teens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A21 
(noting that the Tea Party, which opposed “bloated government,” was “more popular than 
either major party” and that it might “become a major force in American politics”); E.J. 
Schultz, ‘Tea Party Patriots’ Stage Rally:  Sacramento Protest Targets Government, FRESNO 
BEE, Aug. 29, 2009, at A5 (noting that a Tea Party rally in Sacramento drew thousands “to 
protest government over-regulation”). 
 20. Kate Zernike, In Power Push, Movement Sees Base in G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2010, at A1 (“The Tea Party movement ignited a year ago, fueled by anti-establishment 
anger.”). 
 21. Frank Newport, Americans More Likely to Say Government Doing Too Much, 
GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123101/americans-likely-say-
government-doing-too-much.aspx (“Gallup data show that 57% of Americans say the 
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Think tank reports and newspaper commentary condemning the 
proliferation of laws themselves proliferated.22
The hue and cry against overregulation is familiar to anyone who has 
been even a casual observer of recent events.  What is perhaps less obvious, 
however, is how all three branches of the federal government have begun 
echoing the proposition that there are too many burdensome regulations, too 
many wordy statutes, and, in short, too much law.  And they are not just 
talking about the problem; they are making policy and legal decisions to 
attack it. 
 
As Part I describes, the evidence of these policymaking and legal choices 
is apparent in legislative proposals, in executive orders, and even in U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions.  In Congress, several hearings and pending bills 
have addressed initiatives for fairly radical regulatory reform.23  In two 
separate executive orders issued in 2011, President Obama directed all 
federal agencies, including independent agencies, to cull all existing federal 
regulations to weed out “outmoded,” “excessively burdensome” rules.24  
The Supreme Court has even cast the problem in constitutional terms:  in a 
major campaign finance decision in 2010, the Court held that “[p]rolix 
laws” offend the First Amendment because a person of ordinary intelligence 
would be unable to readily determine how they would apply to the speech 
that fell within their ambit.25
These instances, and many others like them, reveal that all three branches 
are taking steps calibrated in various ways to respond to the proliferation of 
federal statutes and regulations, civil as well as criminal.  Indeed, in today’s 
fractious political environment, one may safely guess that the proposition 
that there ought to be less federal law—a sentiment that we may call 
“legislative minimalism”
 
26
 
government is trying to do too many things that should be left to businesses and individuals, 
and 45% say there is too much government regulation of business.  Both reflect the highest 
such readings in more than a decade.”).  For a more qualitative assessment of the impact on 
regulation on popular sentiment, see, for example, Susan E. Dudley, Administrative Law & 
Regulation:  Prospects for Regulatory Reform in 2011, ENGAGE, June 2011, at 7, 7 (“Over 
the course of our history, concerns about the cumulative impact of regulations have 
occasionally reached a level of public discourse that led to meaningful efforts at regulatory 
reform (and even outright deregulation).  There is evidence that we may be witnessing such a 
period today.”). 
—is one of the only propositions that can 
command bipartisan, triple-branch support.   
 22. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 1; James Gattuso et al., Red Tape Rising:  Obama’s 
Torrent of New Regulation, HERITAGE FOUND. 5 (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2482.pdf. 
 23. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies, 76 
Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and 
Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 25. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010). 
 26. The core idea of legislative minimalism—the desirability of less law—has been both 
lauded and mocked for centuries. See, e.g., SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 100 (Gilbert Burnet 
trans., London, R. Reilly 1737) (1516) (“They have but few Laws, and such is their 
Constitution, that they need not many. . . .  [T]hey think it an unreasonable Thing to oblige 
Men to obey a Body of Laws, that are both of such a Bulk, and so dark, that they cannot be 
read or understood by every one of the Subjects.  They have no Lawyers among them, for 
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At least in modern history, the degree of bipartisan consensus on this 
question is at a peak.  During the last apogee of complaints about 
hyperlexis—which occurred during the Reagan Administration—the parties 
and branches were divided on this question.27  Thus, the idea never really 
became dissociated from the particular political agenda of its proponents.  
Today, however, the call for legislative minimalism has become a stock 
proposal for both parties.28
Given the difficulty of achieving even modest political consensus on any 
subject, it feels almost mean-spirited to point out the conceptual problems 
besetting the various accounts of federal hyperlexis.  Nevertheless, the 
purpose of this Article is to present a systematic examination of the idea of 
hyperlexis in federal law,
 
29 as well to explore how the adoption of 
legislative minimalism as a normative ideal challenges current conceptions 
of federal law’s legitimacy.30
Part I of this Article maps the various approaches taken by each of the 
three branches concerning hyperlexis.  This part takes a pointillist approach, 
juxtaposing and combining data points drawn from discrete and 
unconnected aspects of law and from each of the three branches.  The 
picture that emerges shows that animosity to the growth of federal law is 
not (or, at least, is no longer) merely an element of a certain stripe of 
 
 
they consider them as a Sort of People, whose Profession it is to disguise Matters, as well as 
to wrest Laws . . . .”); JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 125 (Claude Rawson ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1726) (“No Law of that Country must exceed in Words the 
Number of Letters in their Alphabet; which consists only of two and twenty.  But indeed, 
few of them extend even to that Length.  They are expressed in the most plain and simple 
Terms, wherein those People are not Mercurial enough to discover above one Interpretation.  
And, to write a Comment upon any Law, is a capital Crime.”). 
 27. See Steven V. Roberts, Democrats Press the ‘Safety’ Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
1986, at B6 (discussing how Democrats were reframing their pro-regulation campaign as a 
matter of “safety” instead of “fairness”). 
 28. See infra Part I. 
 29. This Article will generally use the term “hyperlexis” to refer to the idea of the 
existence of too much federal law, whether it is statutory or regulatory.  Unless otherwise 
qualified, the term “law” will generally be used to encompass both statutes and regulations. 
 30. Though “[t]he sentiment, ‘there’s too much law,’ surely rings true to both 
practitioners and regulated parties, . . . there is remarkably little scholarship delving into this 
glib cliché.” J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen:  The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 762 & n.13 (2003).  
Existing literature touches tangentially on the hyperlexis critique in the federal regulatory 
context. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons:  A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 37 (2003) (assessing “the overregulation hypothesis”); 
Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2003) (noting 
that the “modern critique” of agencies is that “agencies—driven by ideology, bureaucratic 
ambition, or ‘public interest’ pressures—are regulating too strictly and too much”).  But 
existing scholarship has not taken up Professor Manning’s implicit challenge to break down 
systematically the “too much law” critique, see Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of 
Conservation of Ambiguity:  Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 12–13 (1982) (listing 
seven possible meanings of “over-regulation”), nor does it examine how the critique is being 
voiced by and influencing federal institutions.  On the implications of law’s increasing 
pervasiveness, see PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 419 (2000).  For an identification of the phenomenon of regulatory accretion 
and how the administrative state should address the burdens of accretion, see Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra, at 763, 800–23. 
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partisan or ideological rhetoric.  Rather, pursuit of the ideal of legislative 
minimalism is being endorsed as a normative goal and inscribed into black-
letter law by all three branches of the federal government. 
Next, Part II lays out the most common accounts of the problem of 
hyperlexis and then evaluates them to clarify the stakes of the debate.  As 
the inventor of the term “hyperlexis” noted, the hyperlexis critique actually 
incorporates a hodgepodge of alternative claims.31
Where does that leave us?  Part III begins by noting that for all the 
arguments put forth about hyperlexis, an argument that is not made is 
perhaps the most significant.  Critics of hyperlexis have failed to supply a 
reason to think that the proliferation of laws thwarts democratic preference.  
Without a convincing account of a public-choice pathology responsible for 
the uncontrollable generation of hyperlexis, why should hyperlexis should 
be treated as anything other than an unobjectionable consequence of the 
ordinary processes of democracy? 
  In order to assess the 
hyperlexis critique, therefore, it is necessary to break apart and probe 
separately the various senses of the claim that too much law exists.  This 
process reveals that the prevailing descriptions of hyperlexis in federal law 
suffer from serious conceptual flaws in their techniques for measuring 
hyperlexis or in their proposals for remedying it.  Either the diagnostic 
criteria for hyperlexis are faulty, or the prescribed cure has no logical 
relationship to the diagnosed ailment. 
As this part goes on to note, however, the mere fact of law’s democratic 
provenance cannot overcome the hyperlexis critique.  The critique of 
federal hyperlexis draws upon commitments to liberty and to small 
government that have long animated American politics.  At its core, the 
federal hyperlexis critique, and the call to legislative minimalism that flows 
from that critique, operate as an attack on the legitimacy and claim to 
authority of the modern state—and it is an attack that current theories of 
legal legitimacy are not oriented to deflect.  Moreover, efforts to 
accommodate wariness of federal hyperlexis can backfire by producing 
legal regimes that appear partial, unaccountable, or selectively enforced.  
Thus, the hyperlexis critique’s corrosive toll on federal law’s legitimacy has 
the potential to compound itself. 
I.  CONSENSUS ABOUT HYPERLEXIS 
Though they differ in their respective techniques, Congress, the 
President, and the Supreme Court all have recently taken steps expressly 
calibrated to curb or even reverse the growth of federal law.  Some of these 
measures attempt to reduce burdens on regulated entities, others aim at 
cutting the raw number of regulations or reducing the number of pages of 
laws, and still others attempt to simplify the law.  As this part illustrates, 
notwithstanding the ideological divisions between and within the three 
branches, all three branches and members of both parties are making myriad 
efforts to combat the growth of federal law. 
 
 31. See Manning, supra note 30, at 12–13. 
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A.  Congress 
One might reasonably wonder how Congress, whose sole purpose it is to 
enact law, could intelligibly indicate animosity to growth in law, since any 
congressional action will necessarily take the form of additional pages of 
law.  The answer is that it does so under the mantle of reform—normally, 
regulatory reform, but also (though more rarely) through reform of the 
process through which statutes are enacted. 
With respect to regulation, abundant evidence exists of current 
congressional concern about federal hyperlexis.32  For many years, the 
framework of statutes constraining the promulgation of federal regulations 
has remained relatively unchanged.  This framework chiefly consists of the 
Administrative Procedure Act,33 the Congressional Review Act,34 the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,35 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.36  
Today, however, regulatory reform is high on the legislative agenda.  
Congressional committees in both houses of Congress have cast a spotlight 
upon the growth of federal law through a series of hearings.37
 
 32. In describing this elevation of congressional concern, this Article makes the 
parsimonious assumption that Congress is structured in such a way that its activities are 
driven to some extent by information received by its members regarding the effect of their 
choices on relevant outcomes, and that its activities thus represent the results of a collective 
choice that is modestly driven by this calculus.  To employ the convenient shorthand, 
Congress acts upon “its” priorities through its activities. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The 
Price of Public Action:  Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative 
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 13 n.25 (2008) (“Characterizing the legislature, or the 
enacting coalition, as a unitary actor that ‘knows’ the effect of policies on outcomes and 
chooses the policy that would advance ‘its’ interest is a shorthand way of describing this 
more complex collective choice process.”). 
  In concert 
 33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006). 
 34. Id. §§ 801–808.  The Congressional Review Act gives Congress an opportunity to 
“veto” rules it does not approve. Id. § 801.  Agencies must submit reports on certain rules to 
each house of Congress, which then has a certain period to assess such rules and prevent 
them from going into effect. Id.  Congress has only exercised this veto once. Jonathan H. 
Adler, Would the REINS Act Rein in Federal Regulation?, REGULATION, Summer 2011, at 
25. 
 35. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–1571 (2006).  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
requires an assessment of costs and benefits and an accounting, as well as other 
requirements, upon rules that require spending by state, local, and tribal governments or by 
the private sector when those required expenditures exceed $100 million in any one year. Id. 
 36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) is designed principally 
to protect small businesses from excessive regulation by requiring agencies to consider the 
effects of their regulations on small businesses and explore alternatives to minimize the 
economic impact upon such businesses. See id. 
 37. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates, Regulatory Burdens, and the Role of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations & Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. (May 25, 2011); Unfunded Mandates and Regulatory Overreach:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & 
Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Mar. 30, 
2011); Unfunded Mandates and Regulatory Overreach:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2011); APA at 65:  Is Reform Needed to 
Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth, and Reduce Costs?:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (2011) [hereinafter APA at 65]; Federal Regulation:  A Review of Legislative 
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with these hearings, bipartisan supporters in both houses have introduced 
major proposals for regulatory reform that would upend the decades-old 
structure of the administrative state. 
The most notable item on the congressional agenda is the Regulations 
from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 201138 (REINS Act).  The 
REINS Act is intended to invert the structure of the Congressional Review 
Act.  Whereas the Congressional Review Act gives Congress an automatic 
opportunity to veto new rules, the REINS Act would require affirmative 
approval by Congress and the President of any “major” new regulations, 
which are defined to include rules that are likely to result in “a major 
increase in costs or prices for consumers [or] individual industries.”39  For 
this subset of new rules—estimated to number between fifty and eighty 
annually—the REINS Act would functionally require the passage of a 
bespoke law to permit the regulation to go into effect,40 a requirement that 
could very well kill many such regulations or deter their promulgation.  In 
December 2011, the REINS Act passed the House.41
The REINS Act’s structure suggests its proponents believe that new rules 
should be introduced with wariness; that one should be especially wary of 
rules that increase costs to the private sector; and that additional 
congressional supervision is necessary to prevent agencies from exceeding 
the bounds of the power congressionally delegated to them.  Other reforms 
conceive of the problem of hyperlexis in a similar fashion.  A recent 
resolution adopted by the House of Representatives directs House standing 
committees to “inventory and review existing, pending, and proposed 
regulations, orders and other administrative actions . . . by agencies of the 
Federal Government.”
 
42  Adopted with overwhelming bipartisan support,43 
the resolution directs each House standing committee to identify 
“regulations, executive and agency orders, and other administrative actions 
or procedures” that “impede private-sector job creation,” “harm the 
Nation’s global competitiveness,” or “create additional economic 
uncertainty.”44
 
Proposals, Part I, SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (June 23, 
2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/federal-regulation-a-review-of-legislative-
proposals-part-i; Federal Regulation:  A Review of Legislative Proposals, Part II, SENATE 
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/federal-regulation-a-review-of-legislative-proposals-
part-ii. 
  Like the REINS Act, this reform also seeks to address the 
effects of regulatory burdens upon the private sector, albeit with respect to 
existing rules as well as proposed rules. 
 38. H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 39. Id. § 804. 
 40. Adler, supra note 34, at 22–24. 
 41. See Final Results for Roll Call 901, HOUSE OF REP. (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:30 PM), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll901.xml. 
 42. H.R. Res. 72, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 43. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012), H. Res. 72, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HE00072:@@@X (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012) (resolution passed by a vote of 391 to 28). 
 44. H.R. Res. 72. 
1594 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Another regulatory reform proposal mooted by Senator Mark Warner, a 
Democrat from Virginia, would implement a so-called regulatory “pay-go” 
system.45  As it was initially formulated, Senator Warner’s plan would have 
required all federal agencies “to identify and eliminate one existing 
regulation for each new regulation they want to add.”46  His proposal would 
have, in other words, capped the raw number of federal regulations without 
regard to the relative costs, benefits, or harms of the added and eliminated 
rules.  Senator Warner subsequently announced that he would draft 
legislation to require that “agencies would have to provide cost estimates 
for the economically significant rules they plan to impose—and then offset 
those rules by cost burden reductions on existing regulations.”47  The 
revised Warner pay-go proposal would only require federal agencies to 
ensure parity in their costs, not in their net regulatory benefits, and it would 
not require the costs and the benefits offsets to come from the same 
population.48  Other regulatory reform measures currently under 
consideration include proposals to augment the standard of judicial review 
of agency action and to codify requirements for cost-benefit analysis.49
With respect to statutes, symptoms of congressional concern are subtler, 
but they are nonetheless apparent.  Congress is considering measures aimed 
at “tax simplification,”
 
50 despite the fleeting effects of earlier attempts to 
reform the tax code.51  In addition, the House in 2011 effectively ended the 
longstanding practice of issuing commemorative resolutions, such as bills 
celebrating an anniversary of an important event or expressing appreciation 
for particular individuals, animals, or inanimate objects.52  This reform may 
sound trivial, just as the resolutions the reform targets may have been 
trivial, but it will have its intended effect:  a dramatic reduction of the raw 
number of resolutions that pass the House.53
 
 45. See Mark R. Warner, Op-Ed., Red-Tape Relief for a Sluggish Recovery, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A19. 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Federal Regulation:  A Review of Legislative Proposals, Part I:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs (June 23, 2011) (testimony of Sen. Mark 
Warner) [hereinafter Testimony of Mark Warner], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
download/2011-06-23-warner-testimony. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., H.R. 527, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3010, 112th Cong. (2011); SEC 
Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011) (bill requiring SEC to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to issuing new regulations). 
 50. See, e.g., Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011, S. 727, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 51. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 134 (1997) 
(explaining why the 1986 tax reform act, instead of simplifying the tax code, actually 
introduced “staggering new complexities”). 
 52. David A. Fahrenthold, ‘Inspiring’ Votes No Longer Fly in the House, WASH. POST, 
July 4, 2011, at A1 (“Something is off in the House of Representatives:  It’s already July 4, 
and the House still has not yet registered its opinions on bald eagles, motherhood or the 
American flag.”); 112th Congress Legislative Protocols, COMM. ON RULES (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.rules.house.gov/about/PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsID=186. 
 53. See Fahrenthold, supra note 52. 
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B.  The President 
The President has a limited set of options for preventing growth in 
federal statutory law.  Apart from political suasion, in fact, the President has 
only one concrete tool for doing so—the veto—which is, in any event, 
subject to congressional override. 
With respect to federal regulation, however, the President has far more 
discretion.  For more than thirty years, American presidents have tried 
various approaches to restrain the growth of federal regulation.54  These 
efforts, which have focused primarily on restraining the costs and number 
of federal rules, have taken three main forms:  requirements that agencies 
meet cost-benefit criteria for new regulations; requirements that agencies 
submit their regulations for review prior to adoption by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of 
Management and Budget; and requirements that agencies conduct 
retrospective reviews of existing rules to remove the ones that are 
unnecessary or not functioning well.55
Recently, President Obama has made a renewed commitment to efforts to 
reduce the accumulated body of federal regulations.  In an op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal in January 2011,
 
56 he announced the issuance of a new 
executive order (Obama Order) that directs all executive agencies to 
eliminate unnecessary federal regulations.57  The Obama Order instructs 
each executive agency to submit to OIRA a plan under which the executive 
agency will periodically review existing significant regulations to determine 
whether they should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.58  
The Obama Order requires agencies to plan to perform these look-back 
reviews as an ongoing, recurrent exercise.59  The Obama Order also 
reiterates the importance of cost-benefit analysis and of OIRA review.60
Alongside the Order, President Obama also released a “presidential 
memorandum” stating his administration’s commitment to “eliminating 
excessive and unjustified burdens on small businesses, and to ensuring that 
regulations are designed with careful consideration of their effects, 
including their cumulative effects, on small businesses.”
 
61
 
 54. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 487–88 (2003) (summarizing the history of 
presidential efforts to reform regulation). 
  Such 
presidential pronouncements are a critical technique “both of setting an 
 55. Id. 
 56. Obama, supra note 3. 
 57. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Regulatory Flexibility, Small Business, and Job Creation, 76 Fed. Reg. 3827, 
3827 (Jan. 18, 2011).  Under the RFA, agencies may consider such flexibilities as extended 
compliance dates, simplified reporting and compliance requirements, and partial or total 
exemptions for small businesses. See 5 U.S.C. § 603 (2006).  The Memorandum requires 
agencies to justify any failure to offer such flexibilities in proposed or final rules. See 
Regulatory Flexibility, Small Business, and Job Creation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3828. 
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administrative agenda that reflect[s]and advance[s] [the President’s] policy 
and political preferences and of ensuring the execution of [his] program.”62  
Shortly thereafter, President Obama issued a second presidential 
memorandum, aimed at ensuring that agencies accorded “administrative 
flexibility” to state, local, and tribal governments, and that they avoided the 
imposition of “onerous” requirements or “unnecessary regulatory and 
administrative burdens” upon such entities.63
In July 2011, President Obama went a step further by asking even 
independent agencies, including the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission, to comply with his earlier 
executive order.
 
64  No previous executive order targeting regulation had 
ever encompassed the independent regulatory agencies.65
The President’s public presentation of the initiatives was just as 
interesting as the initiatives themselves.  According to the President, the 
Obama Order would reform “regulations that have become a patchwork of 
overlapping rules, the result of tinkering by administrations and legislators 
of both parties and the influence of special interests in Washington over 
decades.”
   
66  He explained that it was his administration’s “mission to root 
out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, or that are just plain 
dumb.”67  The look-back reviews mandated by the new executive order, he 
claimed, would result in the elimination of “absurd and unnecessary 
paperwork requirements that waste time and money,” and the removal of 
“excessive, inconsistent and redundant regulation.”68  Like the first order, 
the Obama Administration heralded the July order aimed at independent 
agencies as necessary to promote the country’s economic strength and 
competitiveness.69
These directives proclaim that there exists a body of ineffective, 
unnecessary, and burdensome federal regulation, and further proclaim that 
the elimination of that surplusage is a task of pressing importance.  This 
premise is not novel on its face; as noted above, previous executive orders 
and presidential memoranda have mandated similar look-back reviews.  
What is novel, though, is the extent of public commitment to this project 
 
 
 62. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2290 (2001). 
 63. See Memorandum on Administrative Flexibility, Lower Costs, and Better Results for 
State, Local, and Tribal Governments, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 123 (Feb. 28, 2011). 
 64. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies, 76 
Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011). 
 65. Charles S. Clark, Obama Widens Regulatory Review to Independent Agencies, 
GOV’T EXEC. (July 11, 2011), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0711/071111cc2.htm?
oref=rellink (noting that Cass Sunstein, the administrator of OIRA, remarked that the order 
was “historic” because “there is no other such free-standing requirement for independent 
agencies”).  Because the agencies are independent, the order is precatory, not mandatory; but 
it is, nonetheless, couched in strong terms. 
 66. Obama, supra note 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Mike Lillis, White House Expands Its Efforts to Reduce Red Tape, THE HILL, 
July 12, 2011, at 4. 
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from a White House, and a Democratic White House at that.  It is also novel 
to encompass independent agencies within this project.  The new directives 
reflect, in short, a pledge by the executive to install as a fixture of the 
modern regulatory state a dedicated mechanism for trimming the growth of 
all forms of that state. 
C.  The Supreme Court 
On one view, the Supreme Court is entrusted with a powerful arsenal 
with which to curb or reverse the growth of federal law:  the provisions of 
the Constitution.  The Court continually addresses the constitutionality of 
federal regulations, statutes, or even entire agencies.  By enforcing 
constitutional limits in these cases, the Court will, as a rule, curtail the 
ability of Congress and the executive to act to some extent.  In that sense, 
almost any constitutional holding restricting a federal law—the Court’s 
entire federalism revolution, for example—could arguably form evidence of 
the Court’s animosity to hyperlexis in federal law. 
But that threshold sets too low a bar.  The Court is obviously motivated 
by multiple incentives to police the constitutional boundaries of federal 
power.  To be confident that distaste for hyperlexis is playing any role at all 
in the Court’s decision-making process, one ought to demand clear or 
particularized evidence of that concern.  Put differently, for a Supreme 
Court opinion to qualify as evidence of judicial concern with federal 
hyperlexis, it ought to consider expressly and openly the burdens of that 
syndrome. 
Until recently, such evidence was quite hard to adduce.  The main reason 
for this likely has to do with the history of the Court’s interaction with the 
regulatory state.  The Court did not have much occasion to deal with 
regulatory law or to fret about its proliferation until the New Deal.  
Between 1930 and 1940, however, seventeen new federal agencies were 
created, doubling the number that had existed since the signing of the 
Constitution.70  Subsequent decades saw increasing involvement by the 
federal government in regulating employment, the environment, and 
consumer transactions.71  In the era following this regulatory spring, federal 
courts’ case dockets became crowded with cases involving federal statutes 
and regulations.72  In response, federal courts overcame their historic 
aversion to statutory law and developed doctrinal mechanisms to channel 
and guide the powers of the modern administrative state.73
 
 70. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 408–09 (1989). 
  Although these 
doctrines are in many respects complex, their core instruction is quite 
simple:  the federal courts must leave policymaking discretion to Congress 
and the agencies, and must consequently abstain from questioning the 
wisdom of statutory and regulatory choices.  To select one conventional 
 71. Id. at 409. 
 72. Id. at 409 & n.10 (“[T]he sheer volume of federal statutes and regulations has 
dramatically changed the business of the federal courts.”). 
 73. Id. at 409. 
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formulation of this idea:  “The fundamental policy questions appropriately 
resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to 
reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of 
agency action.”74
One consequence of this doctrinal development has been that the 
Supreme Court has traditionally treated concerns about the proliferation or 
complexity per se of federal laws and regulations, and whatever that 
phenomenon might portend, as off-limits.  There has never been any 
particular reason why the raw quantity of permits, fees, costs, laws, 
regulations, or agencies should have carried any significance to the Court.  
The Court has continued to apply the “deeply rooted” maxim that 
“ignorance of the law . . . is no defense,” except where Congress has 
authorized the courts in the relevant statute to “soften[]” this presumption.
  Barring a constitutional violation, whether or how 
Congress chooses to resolve the matters of policy entrusted to it is not a 
matter of judicial concern. 
75
In short, the Court has formally refrained from demanding simplicity, 
brevity, or economy from Congress and the agencies.  Concerns about 
federal hyperlexis have, nonetheless, exerted an unmistakable pull upon 
doctrine, and even upon constitutional doctrine. 
  
The Court has never suggested that it is hindered in its ability to “say what 
the law is” by the amount of law that there is. 
Consider the plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States.76  The Clean 
Water Act (CWA) authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the 
Army Corps of Engineers, to issue permits for the discharge of “dredged or 
fill material” into the navigable waters of the United States.77  The question 
before the Court in Rapanos was whether the Corps had correctly 
interpreted the statutory phrase “the waters of the United States.”78
 The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill 
material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not 
trivial.  In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened 
despot, relying on such factors as “economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” 
and “in general, the needs and welfare of the people.”  The average 
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in 
completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit 
spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design 
  The 
opinion begins, however, by sounding the alarm about regulatory 
overreach: 
 
 74. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
558 (1978). 
 75. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991) (“The proliferation of 
statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and 
comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws.  Congress has 
accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent 
to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. . . .  This special 
treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws.”). 
 76. 547 U.S. 715, 719 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 77. Id. at 723. 
 78. Id. at 730. 
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changes.  “[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public 
sectors obtaining wetlands permits.”79
The Rapanos plurality later concedes that the costs of complying with the 
CWA are utterly irrelevant to the question of statutory interpretation before 
the Court, which is a straight Chevron issue.
 
80  But by leading with the 
discussion of regulatory burdens, the plurality places the costs of the 
agency’s proposed interpretation of its statute first and foremost—and 
leaves the reader in little doubt that the entire process is “despot[ic].”81
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board
 
82 offers 
another example.  In this case, the Court cited the enormous scope and 
reach of the federal government as an additional reason for affirming 
presidential power over that bureaucracy:  “The growth of the Executive 
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of 
daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s 
control, and thus from that of the people.”83  Accordingly, the Court ruled 
that the Constitution prohibited an agency head from being protected by 
dual for-cause provisions from Presidential removal.84  This decision 
constituted the “most expansive vision of presidential power over the 
structure of administrative agencies in perhaps ninety years.”85
If the Court had continued to confine its concerns about hyperlexis to 
dicta, such disquisitions would be a phenomenon of mild interest.  In 2010, 
however, the Court incorporated a condemnation of hyperlexis into its 
holding—and into a constitutional holding at that—in Citizens United v. 
FEC.
 
86
 
 79. Id. at 721 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
  In addressing the constitutionality of the federal laws addressing 
campaign finance, the Court noted the “unique and complex rules” imposed 
by this legal regime:  “These entities are subject to separate rules for 33 
different types of political speech.  The FEC has adopted 568 pages of 
regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those 
 80. See id. at 753 (“We have begun our discussion by mentioning, to be sure, the high 
costs imposed by that interpretation—but they are in no way the basis for our decision, 
which rests, plainly and simply, upon the limited meaning that can be borne by the phrase 
‘waters of the United States.’”). 
 81. Id. at 721, 753.  The influence of concern about hyperlexis is similarly apparent in 
dicta in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 412 (1999) 
(“[T]his regulation, and the numerous other regulations and statutes littering this field, 
demonstrate that this is an area where precisely targeted prohibitions are commonplace, and 
where more general prohibitions have been qualified by numerous exceptions.  Given that 
reality, a statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a 
scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the latter.”). 
 82. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 83. Id. at 3156. 
 84. See id. at 3164 (“[T]he Act before us imposes a new type of restriction—two levels 
of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power.  
Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”). 
 85. Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the 
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1 (2010). 
 86. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions since 1975.”87  The Court 
reasoned that given “the complexity of the regulations and the deference 
courts show to administrative determinations,” the body of federal 
campaign finance law was itself a de facto prior restraint on speech:  “[A] 
speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs 
of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for 
prior permission to speak.”88
The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a 
campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or 
seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues 
of our day.  Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws 
chill speech:  People “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
[the law’s] meaning and differ as to its application.”
  In rejecting a limiting interpretation of the 
offensive provision, the Court concluded that the scheme offended the First 
Amendment: 
89
Witness the shift from ignorantia juris non excusat to jus ignorantiae 
ipsius aptat.
 
90  Citizens United appears to say that federal statutory schemes 
can be (to coin a phrase) “void for verbosity” when their complexity makes 
them not easily understandable and they impinge upon a fundamental right.  
It may be the first modern instance of the Supreme Court treating the 
volume and complexity per se of a federal regulatory scheme as an 
unacceptable burden on the exercise of a fundamental right, but surely it 
will not be the last.91
D.  A Coda on Consequences 
 
As the foregoing discussion reflects, wariness of federal hyperlexis and 
the related ideal of legislative minimalism are influencing the various 
branches of the national government in multifarious ways.92
 
 87. Id. at 895. 
  One might 
reasonably wonder whether this influence merits much attention.  After all, 
the relentless manufacturing of more and more federal law has not ceased; 
Congress continues to legislate, the executive branch keeps issuing 
regulations, and the Supreme Court continues to construe and apply federal 
law.  All three cylinders of the lawmaking engine are firing. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 889 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
 90. Roughly, “the law adapts to ignorance of itself.”  Thanks to Varun M. Jain, NYU 
Law School Class of 2014, for supplying a translation of this concept. 
 91. See, e.g., Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1259 (10th Cir. 2010) (Colorado’s 
registration and reporting requirements are unconstitutional because “[t]he average citizen 
cannot be expected to master on his or her own the many campaign financial-disclosure 
requirements set forth in Colorado’s constitution, the Campaign Act, and the Secretary of 
State’s Rules Concerning Campaign and Political Finance.  Even if those rules that apply to 
issue committees may be few, one would have to sift through them all to determine which 
apply.”). 
 92. This is not to say that the idea is deployed in every context where it could have been.  
A systematic account of when and why the hyperlexis critique is launched would be a 
fascinating project, but it is one that lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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The fact that lawmaking is largely inevitable, however, does not render 
irrelevant the content of attitudes about lawmaking.  If lawgivers perceive 
and describe growth in law as illegitimate, that view will affect the public’s 
perception of the legitimacy of the accumulated corpus of law.  We will 
revisit this point in the final part of this Article.  For the moment, it is 
important to recognize that an authentic distrust of hyperlexis can coexist 
with the creation of law.  Indeed, this disjoint may itself play an important 
role in undercutting the law’s legitimacy. 
II.  ACCOUNTS OF HYPERLEXIS 
The hyperlexis critique is a conceptual portmanteau that covers a 
multitude of overlapping, distinct, and mutually incompatible concerns.  
This part introduces the rubrics that are most commonly used to identify, 
measure, and critique the phenomenon of excessive federal law.  The 
discussion then explores various conceptual flaws with each of these 
accounts of hyperlexis. 
Arguments about hyperlexis can be usefully divided into three buckets:  
formal, institutional, and substantive.  The formal arguments focus upon 
superficial aspects of laws—their numerosity or their complexity.  The 
chief institutional objections complain that proliferating federal laws unduly 
intrude on state and local prerogatives or that proliferating federal 
regulations unduly subject individuals and entities to rule by agencies rather 
than Congress.  The substantive bucket contains policy-based arguments 
about cost, such as the arguments that the proliferation of statutes and 
regulations impose excessive burdens and the argument that too many 
unnecessary and unduly burdensome regulations exist. 
At the risk of appearing to miss the forest for the trees, this taxonomy 
omits one oft-heard and very important kind of claim:  the argument that the 
burden imposed upon individual liberty by federal hyperlexis has reached 
an intolerable level.  This omission is purposeful.  The argument that 
hyperlexis encroaches upon liberty is chiefly an argument about the 
consequences of hyperlexis rather than its nature.  Put differently, the 
liberty argument is a second-order argument that relies on one or another of 
the “first-order” accounts of hyperlexis that shall be described below.  So, 
for example, one sees claims that the laws are multiplying in number or 
density to such an extent that individual liberty must have dwindled to the 
vanishing point,93 that the federal government’s intrusion into state and 
local matters imperils individual liberty,94
 
 93. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82 IOWA L. REV. 689, 709 (1997) (“It 
seems that there is not an aspect of our everyday life, from cradle to grave, that is not ruled-
over by what George Wallace used to call ‘pointy-headed, briefcase-totin’-burro-crats in 
Washin’ten Dee Cee.’”). 
 that the surfeit of complex 
 94. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364–66 (2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla.) (holding that 
if Congress could use the Commerce Clause to require everyone to buy health insurance, 
then “Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals”), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 
(2011). 
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federal criminal laws infringes the rights of innocent citizens,95
These categories are not watertight, nor are they mutually exclusive.  
Complaints about hyperlexis rarely remain confined to one category; on the 
contrary, such arguments frequently shift from one category to another.  
This elision makes it all the more important to develop a quick evaluative 
toolkit for recognizing and analyzing various hyperlexis critiques. 
 and so 
forth.  Because the concept of liberty operates on this second-order level, it 
is more fruitfully addressed in Part III of this Article, which discusses the 
effects of the hyperlexis critique. 
A.  Formal Arguments 
1.  The Argument from Numerosity 
Raw counts of the length, weight, or volume of federal laws are the 
beginning (and sometimes the end) of many arguments diagnosing 
hyperlexis.  Though some commentators engage only in qualitative 
appraisals, others appear to relish the parlor-game challenge of totting up 
the words,96 pages,97 physical length,98 tonnage,99 or raw number of federal 
statutes or regulations.100
 
 95. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More 
Ensnared, WALL ST. J., July 23–24, 2011, at A1 (“As federal criminal statutes have 
ballooned, it has become increasingly easy for Americans to end up on the wrong side of the 
law.”).  This Article only briefly touches upon the concept of “over-criminalization.” See 
infra text accompanying notes 
  Cute conceits like estimating the country’s 
114–23, 152–59.  A fair examination of this topic would 
require a detailed examination of state law, a task that lies beyond the scope of this piece.  
For a recent effort to formulate standards by which to measure whether there is too much 
criminal law, see DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION:  THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (2008). 
 96. See, e.g., Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference:  Judicial 
Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2006) (“The Internal 
Revenue Code itself is approximately 1.5 million words long, and in excess of 9,500 pages 
of text, not counting five volumes of regulations.”). 
 97. See, e.g., APA at 65, supra note 37, at 12 fig.2 (statement of Susan Dudley, Director, 
George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center) (showing growth in the number 
of pages in the Federal Register between 1940 and 2010); CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS:  AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE 
FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 13–17, 37–38 (2011), available at 
http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%2010,000%20Commandments%20
2011.pdf (discussing growth in pages of the Federal Register). 
 98. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan:  Will the Centralizing Tide of the 
Twentieth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 105 (2000) (“In 
1928, the unannotated version of the United States Code appeared in two tall volumes that 
totaled six inches in width.  The 1988 version of the unannotated Code included twenty-nine 
volumes that spanned six feet, a twelve-fold increase.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Sean Gorman, Rep. Forbes Says Federal Register Containing Regulations 
Has 34,000 Pages, Weighs 340 Pounds, POLITIFACT (July 1, 2011, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2011/jul/01/randy-forbes/rep-forbes-says-
federal-registration-containing-re/ (responding to a congressman’s estimate that the Federal 
Register weighs 340 pounds by noting that the regulations are printed on both sides of each 
page and not just one, as Representative Forbes apparently assumed). 
 100. See, e.g., CREWS, supra note 97, at 5 tbl.1 (showing an annual increase in Federal 
Register final rules and total rules in various stages of implementation and higher increases 
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“Gross Legal Product” or its “Known Law Reserve” add rhetorical zest.101  
The tax code, for obvious reasons, is a perennial favorite.102  Sometimes the 
most frightening number is no number at all, as when we are told that it is 
“impossible” to count the number of federal crimes,103 or informed that a 
new statute authorizes an “unknowable” number of regulations.104  The 
implication is that an effort to quantify the mass of law would somehow 
exhaust the universe’s supply of time, or possibly of integers.105
It is worth noting at the outset that not all of the numerical indicators of 
the annual increase in federal law are uniformly rising.  The number of 
statutes enacted by Congress has declined in recent years.
  The 
implication is also that the formerly robust sphere of unregulated conduct 
must have shrunk to the size of a mere mote. 
106  The most 
recent Congress was remarkable only because it set an eight-year record 
low for the number of laws passed.  The number of regulations may also 
have been declining,107
 
over one-, five-, and ten-year timeframes for “‘[e]conomically significant’ rules in the 
pipeline”). 
 though some believe this is the calm before a 
 101. The Gross Legal Product represents “how much law we produce annually” while the 
Known Law Reserve “guesstimate[s] how much law has accumulated over our Nation’s two 
hundred years.” Baker, supra note 93, at 690. 
 102. Politicians from both major parties campaign in parallel against the complexity of 
the tax code. See Remarks on the Federal Budget and Job Growth Legislation, 2011 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 650 (Sept. 19, 2011) (announcing that, because of the “decades of 
accumulated loopholes, special interest carve-outs, and other tax 
expenditures . . . . [President Obama is] eager[] to work with Democrats and Republicans to 
reform the Tax Code to make it simpler”); Ron Scherer, Herman Cain’s ‘999 Plan’:  Long 
Overdue Tax Reform or Job Killer?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/President/2011/0930/Herman-Cain-s-999-plan-
long-overdue-tax-reform-or-job-killer.  Even a division of the IRS bemoans the tax code’s 
complexity. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4–6 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
execsummary_2010arc.pdf (highlighting the enormous compliance costs and size of the tax 
code). 
 103. See Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 95 (“Counting [criminal offenses found in 
regulations] is impossible.  The Justice Department spent two years trying in the 1980s, but 
produced only an estimate:  3,000 federal criminal offenses.”). 
 104. See COPELAND, DODD-FRANK, supra note 18, at 3 (“[T]he actual number of rules that 
will be issued by the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau pursuant to the act’s authority 
is currently unknowable.”). 
 105. It seems likely that the actual reason is often both more mundane and more 
intractable—the difficulty of formulating what constitutes “a rule” or “a crime” and, 
additionally, the (quite reasonable) choice by Congress not to impose a hard constraint upon 
the number of rules an agency may use to effectuate a statute’s provisions. 
 106. The last Congress—the 111th—passed 383 public laws. Browse Public Laws, 
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=PublicLaws;c=111 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  The preceding Congress passed 460. 122 Stat. iv (2009).  The 
109th Congress passed 482. 120 Stat. iii (2007).  The 108th Congress passed 498. 118 Stat. 
iv (2005).  The 107th Congress passed 377. 116 Stat. iv (2003).  The 106th Congress passed 
580. 114 Stat. iv (2001).  The 105th Congress passed 394. 112 Stat iv (1999).  And the 104th 
passed 333. 110 Stat. iv (1997). 
 107. See CREWS, supra note 97, at 15–17 (noting that the average number of finalized 
rules in the 1990s was 4,596 while the average number for the years 2000–09 was 3,945).  
Interestingly, the annual Ten Thousand Commandments report, without apparent irony or 
self-reflection, grew from thirty pages in 1996 to fifty-eight pages in 2011, an increase of 86 
1604 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
“regulatory tsunami” that shall be triggered by the twin meteor impacts of 
PPACA and Dodd-Frank.108  Nearly three years into his administration, 
President Obama had approved fewer regulations (though at higher cost to 
business) than President George W. Bush at the same point in his 
presidency, leading one pair of columnists to quip that the tsunami of new 
rules “looks more like a summer swell.”109
A more obvious concern also bears mentioning:  treating words and 
pages as meaningful measurements of the amount of law ignores important 
features of American government, including judicial review, the Supremacy 
Clause, and the ordinary processes of administrative rulemaking.  If a court 
strikes down a federal statute as unconstitutional, is that “more” or “less” 
law?  An immediate reduction in the pages of statutory law may be more 
than offset by the amount of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law 
eventually generated by a new and important federal constitutional 
holding.
 
110
Even if the tallies were all skyrocketing, however, it is not at all clear 
what that trend would really represent.  What is the ideal goal, the desired 
endpoint, implicitly being invoked by these tallies?  The most radical 
answer—some imaginable “zero point” where no law existed—suffers from 
a distinct lack of normative appeal.  The locales where law most completely 
and affirmatively disappears are not places that anyone would willingly 
choose to inhabit.
  What if a new federal statute and regulatory scheme adds 
copious pages of legalese to federal rulebooks, but also preempts a common 
law rule or replaces the overlapping and mutually inconsistent enactments 
of fifty separate states?  Has the aggregate amount of American law gone 
up or down?  Pages are not fungible:  one page of the U.S. Code may 
expand federal law to a previously untouched realm, whereas large chunks 
of each day’s Federal Register may merely elaborate or specify long-
existing requirements without expanding federal law’s scope at all. 
111
A more modest normative vision might unfavorably compare the modern 
regulatory state to a world in which positive law (whether statutory or 
 
 
percent. Compare id., with CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN 
THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS:  A POLICYMAKER’S SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY 
STATE (1996), available at http://cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/10KC_1996.pdf. 
 108. Donohue, supra note 6 (“If you think we’ve seen dramatic increases [in regulation] 
in recent years, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet!”). 
 109. Mark Drajem & Catherine Dodge, Obama Wrote 5% Fewer Rules than Bush While 
Costing Business, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-10-25/obama-wrote-5-fewer-rules-than-bush-while-costing-business.html. 
 110. Consider City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the subsequent legislation 
enacted by a nearly unanimous Congress in response to Boerne (the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006)), and the 
regulations and litigation spurred by RLUIPA. 
 111. One such place may have been the “legal black hole” at the Guantánamo Bay 
detention facility before 2004, when it was yet to be determined whether even federal habeas 
jurisdiction extended over prisoners there. See Ralph Wilde, Legal “Black Hole”?  
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 772–73 (2005) (collecting sources claiming that detention and 
interrogation of the terrorist suspects in Guantánamo Bay occurred in a lawless zone or legal 
black hole). 
2012] THE IDEA OF “TOO MUCH LAW” 1605 
regulatory) has largely disappeared, leaving behind a common law regime 
of property and contract and a rudimentary set of legal systems adequate to 
protect against force and fraud.112
A narrow focus on metrics of numerosity has another important flaw:  it 
misses the real question, which is not how many words or pages there are, 
but rather what these words and pages say.
  This vision does not depict a world of no 
law, but rather a world of primarily judge-made law.  In such a world, 
courts elaborating common law rules would replace legislators as the 
primary source of law.  But where there are courts and judges, there will be 
words and pages.  Common law jurisprudence is not known either for its 
brevity or for its accessibility.  Unlike statutory and regulatory law, its 
aggregate volume can only increase over time.  Is it fair to assume that the 
aggregated corpus of judge-made law could never be “too much law,” when 
that body of law might eventually exceed the page count of those two 
verbose villains, the U.S. Code and the Federal Register?  Arguments about 
numerosity tend to glide over these puzzling implicit determinations about 
the sorts of numerosity in law that are and are not acceptable. 
113
 
 112. A cursory search indicates that few seem to want a wholesale return to the common 
law.  Those who do are often far out of the mainstream, advocating religious law or 
anarchism. E.g., David VanDrunen, Common Law and the Free Society, RELIGION & 
LIBERTY (Acton Inst., Mich.), July–Aug. 1999, at 8, available at 
http://www.acton.org/sites/v4.acton.org/files/pdf/rl_v09n4.pdf.  However, many mainstream 
commentators favor the common law over statutory law in certain respects.  Richard Posner 
prefers the common law for its economic efficiency. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and 
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
487, 502–07 (1980) (defending common law as efficiency-seeking). J.B. Ruhl has argued in 
favor of “a system that relies on common law, rights-based solutions as a predominant, if not 
preferred, approach,” in part, because of its flexibility. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a 
Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System:  A Wake-Up Call for Legal 
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 860–61, 920 (1996).  
Richard Epstein has argued that “[t]he growth of statutory law has lead us away from 
questions of first principle, and from questions of political morality.” Richard A. Epstein, 
Introduction:  Baron Bramwell at the End of the Twentieth Century, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
241, 245 (1994).  Commentators have also argued for a return to common law principles in 
targeted areas. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations:  A 
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) (arguing for a return 
to common law in the field of employment law); Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the 
Securities Laws:  The Case of General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992) 
(arguing that securities law policy supports allowing parties to contract out of the rights and 
requirements created by positive securities law). 
  For example, consider the 
argument that federal criminal law has grown to an unacceptable extent.  
Using metrics of numerosity, growth of the federal criminal code is not 
 113. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:  Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 
42 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (1992) (noting that he could not “prove increased regulatory burdens by 
counting pages in the Federal Register (although many have purported to do so)”).  Two 
scholars have argued that even a system containing only “individually perfect” rules would 
face a downside of “system burdens” when there are too many laws in aggregate, but 
nonetheless agreed that “the solution is not . . . to reduce the number of rules.” Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra note 30, at 764, 768, 800–23.  Indeed, the argument that system burdens 
matter only poses further, vexing empirical questions:  do the benefits of the new laws 
outweigh their costs plus any alleged system burdens?  There is no good way to know. See 
id. at 830 (noting that one of the difficulties is determining “the effects of accretion” on the 
“payoff of rules”). 
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difficult to show.114  The first federal criminal statute criminalized treason, 
counterfeiting, piracy, and murder, maiming and robbery in federal 
jurisdictions.115  By the start of the twentieth century, dozens of federal 
criminal offenses existed.116  Recent efforts to count the number of federal 
criminal laws have (ominously) failed.  Conservative estimates indicate that 
over 3,000 and probably over 4,000 such offenses exist today.117  These 
laws prohibit everything from the worst malum in se crimes (treason, 
assassination) to the most comical malum prohibitum offenses.118  This 
apparent expansion has drawn vigorous criticism from many quarters.  
Indeed, “for the past generation, virtually everyone who has written about 
federal criminal law has bemoaned its expansion.”119
At least some of the fervor behind this unanimity must flow from the 
apparently asymptotic growth of the numbers of words, pages, and crimes 
that comprise the federal criminal code.  But a look behind the numbers, 
however, suggests that the expansion of federal criminal law may not have 
been very significant, at least from the perspective of a person who was 
already regulated by a state sovereign (which is to say, any resident of any 
of the fifty states).  Much federal criminal law merely parrots what is 
already illegal under state laws,
 
120 and the accretion of esoteric federal 
offenses in the codebooks may therefore not have much felt impact to 
ordinary individuals.  Federal authorities have concurrent jurisdiction over 
an array of criminal activity also regulated by the states, but “the national 
government’s exercise of its concurrent authority has been so selective that 
its share of overall enforcement has actually declined for more than the last 
half century.”121  Federal criminal law enforcement accounts for only about 
6 percent of the country’s total felony prosecutions each year.122
 
 114. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to 
Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 548 (2005) (collecting data). 
  A 
blinkered focus on metrics of numerosity obscures these substantive details, 
 115. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 
Stat. 112 (1790); cf. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 95. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. The most “famously innocuous federal crimes” are the “Woodsy Owl” statute, which 
prohibits the unauthorized use of the character “Woodsy Owl,” the name “Woodsy Owl,” 
and the associated slogan, “Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute,” and the federal prohibition against 
tearing the tag off a mattress (which applies to dealers, not consumers). See Daniel C. 
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge:  An Essay on the Political Economy of 
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590 n.13 (2005); see also Stuart P. Green, 
Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress:  Overcriminalization and the Moral 
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 & n.264 (1997). 
 119. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 508 (2001). 
 120. Baker, supra note 114, at 575–76 (“As is well known, however, the expansion of 
federal criminal law has largely involved a duplication of state crimes.”). 
 121. Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 247, 252 (1997). 
 122. See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2005, at 6 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs05.pdf (“Felony 
convictions in federal court increased from 4% of the nation’s felony convictions in 1996 to 
6% in 2004.”).  
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which have obvious relevance to the question whether the quantum of 
federal criminal law has exceeded the optimal level. 
In sum, one should be wary of arguments from numerosity both because 
numerosity is a slippery metric and because numerosity alone does not 
make out a prima facie case for illegitimacy.  Perhaps in part because of the 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of numerosity arguments, critics of hyperlexis 
rarely use numerosity except as a launching pad for supplementary 
arguments, including complaints about excessive complexity or costs.  
These are discussed in turn below.  For the moment, the important point is a 
very simple one—a critique of hyperlexis that relies solely on claims about 
numerosity skates on thin normative ice. 
2.  The Argument from Complexity 
The argument from complexity contends that the system of federal law 
has become unacceptably complicated.  This is a superficial or formal 
argument, in the sense that (like the argument from numerosity) it targets 
the format in which the law is elaborated and stated, rather than the source 
of the law or the law’s substantive content.123
Unlike with numerosity, metrics for complexity are not readily 
accessible.  Complexity is itself complex:  the notion of complexity 
incorporates several independent characteristics or vectors including 
“density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty.”
 
124  
Professor Richard Epstein defines a complex rule as one that has high 
compliance costs but also as one that “has pervasive application across 
routine social activities, and is not directed solely to the dangerous activities 
of people who live at the margins of society.”125  This suggests that 
complexity ought to be measured not just by a rule’s formal properties, but 
also by the likelihood that it affects “the day-to-day conduct of ordinary 
people.”126
Assessing complexity is a delicate matter.  Is a legal system more 
complex when it is made up of lengthy rules or terse standards?
 
127
 
 123. The words “superficial” and “formal” are not here intended to be pejorative or to 
connote a lack of gravity; some objections to form, such as an objection to how a criminal 
law is disseminated, can be very serious indeed. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 
225, 230 (1957) (noting that a due process violation would exist if a criminal law were 
“written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community”). 
  It is 
hard to say; long and numerous laws may be fairer and easier to understand 
while a system of few and short laws may be opaque and difficult to apply.  
Thus, a world of only a handful of simple rules may be a much more 
 124. Schuck, supra note 113, at 3. 
 125. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 29 (1995). 
 126. Id. 
 127. The ancient rules-versus-standards debate proceeds.  For an example of recent 
pro-standards scholarship, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation:  On 
the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1223–25 (2010), which argues that 
standards necessitate moral deliberation and thereby promote democracy. 
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baffling world in which to operate, even though that confusion is precisely 
the fundamental objection to complexity.128
Let us make the (unwarranted) assumption that shorter laws are 
inherently less complex and further make the (less unwarranted) assumption 
that the corpus of federal law is increasing in complexity.  That still leaves a 
harder, normative question:  how complex should the federal legal system 
be?
 
129  Although complexity “often is discussed as an evil to be 
minimized,” it does not automatically impose an undesirable cost.130  For 
example, “[l]egal complexity sometimes produces fairer, more refined, 
more efficient, even more certain, forms of social control,” for instance, by 
tailoring the rule to each of the goals and constraints of the policy that 
drives the rule.131  In addition, complex rules may be perceived as more just 
because they more finely grade legal consequences to conduct or status.132
Even, however, if the factors that affect complexity could somehow 
magically be pinpointed, and an optimal level of complexity identified, that 
level might not be possible to achieve because of the way that aspects of 
complexity mutually interact.  “The legal system as a whole exhibits a 
marked tendency to become more complex, a feature that it appears to share 
with other systems, physical and social.”
 
133  Growing complexity “may 
reflect a more secular, perhaps even universal, dynamic affecting such 
systems.”134
Complexity is easy to redistribute but hard to reduce.
 
135  Efforts to 
reduce one sort of complexity, such as density, technicality, or 
differentiation, often require trading off against another form of complexity, 
like indeterminacy or uncertainty.  Such efforts may also result in trading 
off complexity “here and now” versus complexity “there and later.”136
 
 128. See EPSTEIN, supra note 
  
125, at 28 (“It is also a dangerous mistake to think of a rule 
as simple just because it is short.”); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of 
Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 161 (1995) (describing the elimination of 
complexity as “misguided” because of uselessness of “the simplest rules”).  The main 
objection to complexity is the difficulty in compliance. 
 129. See Schuck, supra note 113, at 8 (“The question always is:  All things considered, 
are the benefits of a given level of complexity worth its costs?  There is no general answer to 
this question, of course . . . .  [C]omplexity should not be seen as a symbol of what is wrong 
with American law more generally.  Indeed complexity is both a weakness and a strength.”). 
 130. Kaplow, supra note 128, at 161; see also Schuck, supra note 113, at 8. 
 131. Schuck, supra note 113, at 8, 37. 
 132. See Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
557, 589 (“[P]sychology brings to light a previously unrecognized virtue of legal 
complexity—to wit, its potential to calm citizens’ reactions in their engagement with rules, 
to the extent complexity is manifested as gradations of legal consequences.”). 
 133. Schuck, supra note 113, at 9. 
 134. Id. at 9 n.28. 
 135. R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity:  An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t 
Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 718 (2000) (“[C]omplexity in the law 
cannot simply be reduced in any reasonably uncontroversial way.  Simplifying the law in 
general, or even some particular area of the law, takes on the profitlessness of the proverbial 
wild goose chase.”). 
 136. See id. at 744 (“[E]ven if we can all agree that we have simplified the law in some 
respect, we may have only displaced the complexity of the law forward or backward in the 
overall lawmaking and implementation process . . . .”). 
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Well-intentioned efforts to reduce complexity may not just fail, but backfire 
by deferring or displacing complexity at a usurious interest rate.137
A more concrete example—the outcome of Citizens United—illustrates 
these pitfalls.  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court endorsed what this 
Article has called a “void for verbosity” doctrine, holding in part that 
certain laws regulating campaign-related speech were simply too 
complicated to be permissible under the First Amendment.
 
138  The Court 
treated the FEC’s “1,278 pages of explanations and justifications” and its 
“568 pages of regulations” as evidence that the regulation functioned as 
prior restraint because of its complexity,139 arguing that a person “of 
common intelligence” could not work out how the law should apply to her 
conduct.140  But the opposite result could have followed just as well.  While 
dense, these regulations may have been determinate; the agency’s copious 
explanations and justifications may have shed light, rather than obscured a 
speaker’s path; and the volume of advisory opinions may have made the 
corpus of federal campaign finance law more, rather than less, digestible.  
In other words, people of average intelligence may have better understood 
long regulations rather than short statutes that used terms of art.141  The 
immigration laws, to take one example, are made vastly more accessible to 
people of average intelligence by the reams of guidance published by the 
responsible federal agency.142
The Citizens United opinion also illustrates how intractable the problem 
of complexity is.  The Court’s opinion (which was accompanied by two 
concurrences and two opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
struck down one provision of the statute regulating campaign finance but 
left untouched the rest.
  The plethora of explanations, justifications, 
and opinions condemned by Citizens United could have mitigated the 
concerns of complexity that so struck the Court. 
143  This pruning is unlikely to improve much of the 
complexity the Court condemned; in all likelihood, the opinion will spur 
further regulation, legislation,144
 
 137. To take an extreme example, entirely repealing federal statutory and regulatory law 
because of its perceived complexity would leave behind a system of judge-made common 
law chiefly designed to protect property and common law rights.  Whatever its other benefits 
may be, such a system may not actually result in a net decrease in complexity over the 
current system. 
 litigation, and interpretation.  Campaign 
finance law will continue to occupy “a ‘patch-work’ world” whose chief 
ingredients are “unchanged regulation, deregulation, . . . stalled regulation, 
 138. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010). 
 139. Id. at 895. 
 140. Id. at 889; supra text accompanying note 89. 
 141. For an example of a short legal rule unreadable to a lay person, see Skilling v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927 (2010) (parsing “the intangible right of honest services”). 
 142. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Feb. 12, 2012), 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (collecting handbooks, guidance, manuals, “how to” 
guides, and other resources). 
 143. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (striking corporate independent expenditures 
provisions but preserving disclosure and disclaimer requirements). 
 144. For discussion of how states have reacted to Citizens United, see Alex Grout & 
Shanna Reulbach, CU+The States, WM. & MARY ELECTION LAW SOC’Y, 
http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/links/citizens-united-and-the-states/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2011). 
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and re-regulation.”145
B.  Institutional Arguments 
  In short, whatever its other virtues or flaws may be, 
the net effects of Citizens United upon the ultimate complexity of law are 
indeterminate. 
The chief institutional arguments about hyperlexis speak to one of two 
questions:  first, whether there is too much federal law, as opposed to state 
law; and second, whether there is too much federal regulatory law, as 
opposed to federal statutory law.146
1.  The Argument from Federalism 
  As described below, key portions of 
both arguments rest upon questionable assumptions about the incentives of 
federal and state legislative actors. 
The federalism account of hyperlexis criticizes the proliferation of 
federal law on the grounds that it unduly extends into matters traditionally 
regulated by state and local governments.  This argument mates a legal 
argument with a positive claim.  The legal argument is that Congress is 
acting in excess of the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, and the 
positive claim is that restricting congressional action to within the strict 
boundaries of Article I would result in a net reduction in the amount of 
federal law to which Americans are subject. 
It lies beyond the scope of this (or perhaps any) Article to assess the 
continent of legal scholarship that addresses the first claim.  Reasons to 
doubt the second claim, however, have been eloquently stated by Professor 
Daryl Levinson.147  The conventional account of competitive federalism 
rests on the premise that the federal and state governments are “self-
interested political actors with empire-building ambitions, pitted against 
each other in a competition for power.”148  As Professor Levinson has 
argued, however, this assumption is unwarranted:  “[T]here is no logical 
relationship between the policy interests of state citizens and the amount of 
regulation flowing from the federal government or left to the states.”149  
Consequently, “[e]ven if state officials had dictatorial influence over the 
policies of the federal government, there is no reason to expect that they 
would systematically prefer limiting federal power to expanding it.”150
 
 145. Stephen G. Wood et al., Regulation, Deregulation and Re-regulation:  An American 
Perspective, 1987 BYU L. REV. 381, 383 (describing “[a] world of partial deregulation” 
(quoting Thomas J. Campbell, Regulation, Deregulation, and Re-regulation:  Theory and 
Practice, 20 STAN. LAW. 25, 25 (1985))). 
 
 146. A third “institutional” argument, which contends that there is too much statutory and 
regulatory law and too little common law, is evaluated in the text accompanying supra note 
111. 
 147. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional 
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005). 
 148. Id. at 944. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.; see also infra note 157 (giving an example of this dynamic at work). 
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It is therefore not clear, at least a priori, whether increased stringency in 
enforcing federalist principles would necessarily result in a reduction even 
in federal law.151
An additional word must be said about the federalism-based critique of 
federal criminal law, sometimes referred to as the “overfederalization” of 
criminal law.  The expansion of federal criminal law has produced 
concurrent state and federal criminal laws that carry disparate sentences for 
identical conduct.  The resulting regime, the argument goes, offends values 
of fairness and federalism.
  The consequences for state law are even murkier:  there 
is no reason to think that the states would not enact their own versions of 
the federal laws deemed to exceed the constraints of federal law.  In short, 
stringent enforcement of federalist principles has indeterminate effects upon 
the total quantum of law (even just of federal law). 
152
Differential consequences for identical conduct are an ordinary artifact of 
the dual system of American sovereignty.  Of course, one might be troubled 
by arbitrary disparities in the criminal context, even if attaching different 
consequences to the same conduct in the civil context may seem 
unobjectionable or even beneficial.  But even if we assume that criminal 
sentencing disparities are troubling and ought to be eliminated, it is not 
clear that reversing the expansion of federal criminal law is the best way to 
eliminate them.  The laws of the fifty states are not identical, so any 
prosecution attaches consequences to conduct that are arbitrary, in the sense 
that they are based on geography.  These disparities may represent the 
“policy choices of individual states,” but they are disparities nonetheless.  
The federal system of prosecution is the only available technique for 
guaranteeing that an accused in Missouri will face the same set of potential 
consequences as an accused in Maine.
 
153
 
 151. Levinson, supra note 
  Thus, at least to some degree, 
concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction reduces, rather than augments, 
disparity of treatment.  Taking the same point from the opposite angle, 
sentencing disparities could just as well be reduced by harmonizing the 
laws of the states with federal law, rather than by contracting federal 
criminal law.  Sentencing disparities could also be reduced by dramatically 
147, at 941. 
 152. Baker, supra note 114, at 576 (“As federal criminal law duplicates more state 
crimes, the potential for disparity clearly escalates.  The disparity in sentencing between 
those prosecuted in federal versus state court for the same crime reflects the efforts of 
Congress and the DOJ to take away from state legislatures, judges, and juries control of the 
police power in their communities.”); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of 
Overcriminalization:  From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 747, 776 (2005); Levinson, supra note 147, at 941. 
 153. For example, “the decision whether to ask for the death penalty is not made by the 
prosecutors in the local U.S. Attorney’s Office but instead by a committee in Main Justice,” 
which is “intended to ensure that federal law is enforced according to the same standards 
nationwide.” Beale, supra note 152, at 770.  Although this procedure “has the effect of 
overriding the choice of voters in states that have not authorized capital punishment,” id., it 
also has the effect of equalizing the consequences of conduct on a nationwide basis for the 
class of defendants subjected to federal prosecution. 
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increasing, not decreasing, the enforcement of federal criminal law, rather 
than by contracting its scope.154
Other scholars have criticized the invasion of “local” realms of authority 
by federal criminal laws.
 
155  But, bracketing the difficulty of defining what 
is truly “local,” the expansion of federal criminal law may help and not 
hinder the achievement of local criminal policy priorities.156  The states 
may prefer more federal criminal law, not less.157
2.  The Argument from Over-Delegation 
  None of these points are 
particularly compatible with the view that federal law’s scope has expanded 
overmuch. 
The argument from over-delegation contends that a negligent or fearful 
Congress,158 by delegating lawmaking power to executive agencies, enables 
the production of a surfeit of complex federal regulations that would not 
otherwise exist.159  The argument from over-delegation criticizes both the 
“too many” statutes that delegate such power and the “too many” 
regulations that result from these illegitimate delegations.160
 
 154. Id. at 776 (recommending that “federal enforcement becomes the norm for a 
category of cases, even if that category is one that has not traditionally been treated as a 
federal crime,” to rectify disparities between federal and state prosecutions). 
 
 155. John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 
TEMP. L. REV. 673, 712 (1999); Beale, supra note 152, at 776; Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal 
Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1136 
(1995). 
 156. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:  A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 182 (2010) (“[I]f the severity of 
punishment for the same crime differs between two states, then rational criminals have an 
incentive to commit their crimes in the state with milder punishment.  Perceiving this fact, 
states might enact severe punishments to deflect crime away from themselves and onto 
others.  This interstate externality could cause the states to race towards severity, even 
though all states would benefit from lowering average punishments and reducing the burden 
on their prisons.  Could Congress rely on this rationale to federalize all of criminal law?”). 
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1982 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  In that case, twenty-nine states appeared as amici to argue that the federal 
government’s civil commitment scheme for sexual offenders was constitutional because, 
among other reasons, “the cost of detaining such persons is ‘expensive’—approximately 
$64,000 per year—and these States would rather the Federal Government bear this expense.” 
Id. (quoting Brief for the States of Kansas et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
2, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224)). 
 158. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power:  Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 
(2006) (“The question, ‘Why do legislators delegate?’ and the closely related question, ‘Why 
do legislators draft ambiguous statutes?’ are the subject of a rich literature.  Suggested 
explanations include the need to leave technical questions to experts, politicians’ desire to 
duck blame for unpopular choices or to create new opportunities for constituency service, the 
inability of multimember legislatures to reach stable consensus, and the impossibility (or 
excessive cost) of anticipating and resolving all relevant implementation issues in 
advance.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 34, at 22–24 (“The dramatic increase in the scope of 
federal regulation has been facilitated by the practice of delegating substantial amounts of 
regulatory authority and policy discretion to federal regulatory agencies.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686–87 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  
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Like the argument from federalism, the argument from over-delegation 
has two logically distinct components.  The first component, which is a 
legal argument, contends that (at least some) congressional delegations of 
power to agencies are constitutionally flawed because of the Supreme 
Court’s low threshold for what qualifies as an “intelligible principle” for 
guiding agency action.161  The second component is a positive claim that 
maintains that the wide-ranging regulations promulgated pursuant to these 
improper congressional delegations would not have existed in the absence 
of the delegations.162
Of course, it is likely true that Congress could not manufacture 
regulations at anywhere near the same volume as the collected corps of 
federal agencies.
 
163  But this fact alone does not establish that curbing 
Congress’s ability to delegate would lessen federal hyperlexis.  Even the 
most ardent critics of delegation doctrine concede there is some way to 
formulate delegations that will make them constitutionally permissible.164
Congress might also employ alternative techniques that would eventually 
achieve an equally expansive terrain for federal law.  The power to tax and 
spend is fungible with the power to specify standards of regulatory conduct; 
either tax-and-spend programs or regulatory mandates can be used to 
achieve the same practical results.
  
It is more plausible that, if its hand were forced, Congress would pass 
legislation that met that threshold (whatever it was) than that it would 
abandon outright whole realms of federal power. 
165
 
HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Adler, supra note 
  For example, instead of directing a 
34, at 
24 (“Over the course of the 20th century, Congress has delegated ever greater amounts of 
regulatory authority to an ever-expanding array of federal agencies. . . .  The delegation of 
broad and far-reaching regulatory authority has undermined political accountability for 
regulatory decisions and has allowed for regulatory agencies to adopt policies that did not 
always align with congressional intent or contemporary priorities.”); Theodore J. Lowi, Two 
Roads to Serfdom:  Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
295, 295–96 (1987). 
 161. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (“In the history of 
the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one 
of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which 
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard 
than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’”). 
 162. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 34, at 24. 
 163. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power:  A 
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987) (“Given the nature and level 
of government intervention that Congress now authorizes, it could not possibly make the 
hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of important policy decisions that agencies make 
annually.”); Schuck, supra note 113, at 10 (“[T]he pervasive delegation of discretion to 
agencies (and to courts) means that the resulting legal regime is almost certain to become 
more dense, technical, institutionally differentiated, and indeterminate than if the legislature 
had simply promulgated a rule itself.”). 
 164. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine:  Could the Court Give It 
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1259 (1985) (distinguishing acceptable from 
unacceptable delegations). 
 165. MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?  THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND 
TAXATION 44 (1999) (“[R]egulation and taxation are substitutes one for the other” and thus 
states may achieve policy goals “either through the public-spending programs that tax 
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federal agency to regulate the kinds of health insurance that companies may 
sell, Congress could tax insurers and appropriate the resulting federal funds 
for the executive branch to spend, at its discretion, on providing individuals 
with insurance.  The executive branch agency charged with handing out the 
insurance could disburse it through a detailed discretionary scheme without 
running afoul of the delegation doctrine, at least as it is conventionally 
understood.166
Enforcing a more stringent threshold for congressional delegations may 
have a host of good or bad consequences on a number of axes.  But if the 
axis is the quantity of federal law, the effects are likely indeterminate.  
Tighter limits upon delegation might restrain a particular channel for 
exercising federal authority, but there is little reason to think that it would 
ultimately reduce the expression of that authority through the other 
channels accessible to federal power. 
  How can one reliably assess whether this scenario would 
result in a lesser total quantum of federal law? 
C.  Substantive Arguments 
In the realm of formal and institutional objections to hyperlexis, concrete 
normative goals were elusive, or methods to obtain these goals were 
obscure.  In the realm of substantive or policy-based critiques, one would 
expect to find more robust normative guideposts against which to judge the 
existence of too much law and more robust techniques for reaching these 
guideposts.  As the discussion below shows, however, significant 
conceptual and logical hurdles face the chief substantive critique of federal 
hyperlexis:  the argument that federal law is too costly. 
The costs of federal law are borne by individuals, business organizations, 
labor unions, and state, local, and tribal governments.  The federal 
government bears the costs of issuing and enforcing federal law, which 
include the costs of paying for federal agencies and associated personnel.167
The costs of law come in many guises; they include not just direct 
outlays in the form of compliance costs but less tangible effects, such as 
foregone opportunities.
 
168
 
revenues finance or through regulatory mandates requiring that actors take certain steps and 
forbear from others”). 
  The law may incur costs even, or especially, 
 166. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 467 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine 
and the Line Item Veto:  A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its 
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 320 (2001) (noting that 
the Constitution’s history, purpose, and structure indicate that non-delegation doctrine does 
not apply to appropriations laws); Schoenbrod, supra note 164, at 1270–71 (“Congress, if it 
were providing a benefit, could decide whether it would be available by rule or 
administrative discretion,” and thus “Congress could . . . decide to make the benefit available 
on the basis of administrative discretion and authorize the Executive to exercise that 
discretion without encountering delegation problems.”). 
 167. See Dudley, supra note 21, at 7, 8 fig.1 (showing rising budgetary costs of running 
federal regulatory agencies). 
 168. Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 135 (2007) 
(explaining that opportunity costs should be incorporated into cost-benefit analysis, although 
not without “first asking important normative questions about intergenerational justice”). 
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when its application is uncertain; some assert that “regulatory uncertainty” 
acts as a cost that harms the competitiveness of American businesses, 
though such claims are hard to substantiate.169  Not only are such costs 
pervasive in the economy, but, according to this argument, they are also 
rising.170  The argument from costs criticizes the quantity of federal law—
statutory and/or regulatory—by contending that the aggregate costs flowing 
from that corpus of law have reached an unacceptably high level.171
1.  The Argument from Statutory Costs 
 
Although the argument from costs has a powerful superficial appeal, it 
nonetheless runs into multiple difficulties.  With respect to statutes, the 
main problem is locating a normative baseline for what constitutes, in 
general terms, the “right” amount of money for America to spend on a 
federal law. 
 
 169. See, e.g., EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH:  FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 19–20 (1999) (noting that “environmental regulation does not place 
any restrictions on job growth” and that such regulation may actually help in a downturn); 
Bruce Bartlett, Misrepresentations, Regulations and Jobs, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG 
(Oct. 4, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/regulation-and-
unemployment/ (noting and disputing the popular argument that “Barack Obama has 
unleashed a tidal wave of new regulations, which has created uncertainty among businesses 
and prevents them from investing and hiring”); Jan Eberly, Is Regulatory Uncertainty a 
Major Impediment to Job Growth?, DEP’T OF TREASURY (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Is-Regulatory-Uncertainty-a-Major-
Impediment-to-Job-Growth.aspx (using financial and survey data to argue that regulatory 
uncertainty is not causing unemployment); see also Robb Mandelbaum, Do Small Business 
Owners Feel Overtaxed and Overregulated?  A Survey Says No, N.Y. TIMES YOU’RE THE 
BOSS BLOG (Nov. 21, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/small-
businesses-over-taxed-and-over-regulated-a-survey-says-no/ (noting that small businesses 
cited regulations and taxes as less important than the lack of paying customers and 
unspecified complaints about the economy). 
  What assertions of harm to American economic competitiveness may lack in 
verifiability, they make up for in sheer rhetorical force.  Competitiveness arguments “up the 
ante” by positing that the costs of hyperlexis are “not a parochial concern of certain 
industries or institutions, but a shared vital general interest.” Marc Galanter, The Turn 
Against Law:  The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 298 
(2003).  Professor Galanter is addressing arguments about the harms to competition of the 
proliferation of lawsuits, not regulatory costs, but his insight applies in this context. 
 170. See CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 2, at 25 (“[T]he ‘real’ cost of economic regulations 
increased by $63 billion between 2004 and 2008.”); see also J. Scott Moody et al., The 
Rising Cost of Complying with the Federal Income Tax, SPECIAL REP. (Tax Found., D.C.), 
Dec. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr138.pdf (“In the last 
century the cost of tax compliance has grown tremendously.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Press Release, Business Roundtable, America’s CEOs Lay Out Roadmap 
for Comprehensive Regulatory Reform (Sept. 20, 2011), http://businessroundtable.org/
uploads/studies-reports/downloads/BRT_Smarter_Reg_One_Pager_09_20_11.pdf (arguing 
that a Business Roundtable report “finds that federal regulation costs too much” and 
therefore “[i]t’s [t]ime to [e]nd [o]verly [p]rescriptive and [b]urdensome [f]ederal 
[r]egulation”); see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, ACHIEVING SMARTER REGULATION 5 (2011), 
available at http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-
reports/downloads/2011_09_BRT_Achieving_Smarter_Regulation.pdf (“[W]hile any 
individual regulation might be cost-effective, the cumulative impact of all regulations can be 
anything but.”). 
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The theoretical literature offers scant guidance on this question.  Law and 
economics instructs that a law can increase overall utility when the law’s 
compliance costs and enforcement costs are outweighed by the aggregated 
benefits of enacting it.  But the theory of law and economics offers no 
answer to the question whether only economically efficient laws should be 
enacted.172  Many statutes are designed precisely to achieve objectives that 
the unconstrained actions of private actors would not otherwise bring about.  
“[N]o plausible theory of legislation treats congressional enactments as 
intended to promote efficiency, save in unusual circumstances.”173  Indeed, 
“[t]he very decision to create a regulatory system often reflects a rejection 
of private willingness to pay as the criterion of social choice.”174  With all 
due respect to Bentham, most would agree that this is as it should be:  
“Society is not best taken as some maximizing machine, in which aggregate 
output is all that matters.”175
The argument from costs ignores these theoretical knots by treating each 
dollar that a federal statute costs as an automatic mark against it.  But the 
argument from costs skips over an essential conceptual element:  an account 
of what federal law ought to cost and to whom. 
 
A minor but concrete example—a recent kerfuffle concerning a new tax 
provision enacted as part of PPACA and then repealed—illustrates the 
slipperiness of the argument from statutory cost.  The new tax provision 
would have required business owners, beginning in 2012, to file a tax 
reporting document known as a Form 1099 whenever the business 
purchased more than $600 in goods or services in a single year from any 
vendor, including a corporation.176  For nearly thirty years, the GAO has 
been worrying about the “tax gap,” i.e., the gap between taxes legally owed 
and taxes paid.177  They recommended, among other things, increasing the 
amount of reporting on 1099s.178
 
 172. See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 281, 287 (1979) (“In measuring economic costs and benefits, the economist qua 
economist is not engaged in the separate task of telling policymakers how much weight to 
assign to economic factors.”). 
  Presidents from both parties, including 
George W. Bush and Obama, incorporated the 1099 proposal in their 
 173. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1267, 1273 (1981). 
 174. Sunstein, supra note 70, at 488 (“Many statutes are designed to transform rather than 
to implement preferences, to redistribute resources, or to reflect the outcome of a 
deliberative process about relevant public values.”). 
 175. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1661 
(2001). But see Paul Rosenzweig, Overcriminalization:  An Agenda for Change, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 809, 815 (2005) (arguing that “one should demand of Congress that it begin efforts 
to measure” the costs of overcriminalization). 
 176. PPACA § 9006, 26 U.S.C. § 6041 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 177. See Richard B. Malamud & Richard O. Parry, It’s Time to Do Something About the 
Tax Gap, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 11–15 (2008) (describing GAO activism on the tax 
gap). 
 178. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP:  A STRATEGY 
FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE 48–49 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf 
(suggesting that Form 1099 could include sole proprietors’ gross receipts and transactions 
less than $600). 
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proposed budgets to Congress.179  The measure was predicted to raise 
billions in revenue, and it was enacted as part of PPACA on that basis.180
After enactment, however, an acute case of “legislators’ remorse” set 
in.
 
181  A chorus of complaints about the compliance costs of the provision 
promptly ensued.182  The calls for repeal were framed in the familiar 
language of hyperlexis; the 1099 rule was “bureaucratic red tape” that 
would unduly burden businesses, especially small businesses.183  President 
Obama echoed these concerns in his State of the Union address, calling the 
provision a “flaw in the legislation that has placed an unnecessary 
bookkeeping burden on small businesses.”184  The measure was 
subsequently repealed,185 to the applause of lawmakers who had previously 
supported it as an important revenue-raising tool.186
The fate of this ill-starred provision encapsulates why costs are a difficult 
metric on which to evaluate federal statutes.  The costs of imposing the law 
on affected entities seemed bearable before PPACA was enacted (indeed for 
decades before) to bipartisan (and indeed nonpartisan) observers.  
 
 
 179. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-238, TAX GAP:  IRS COULD DO 
MORE TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE BY THIRD PARTIES WITH MISCELLANEOUS INCOME 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09238.pdf 
(noting that the Bush 2008 and 2009 budgets incorporated the 1099 rule); Julian Pecquet, 
Obama Budget Retains Part of Health Reform’s 1099 Tax Reporting Requirement, HILL 
HEALTHWATCH (Feb. 14, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-
reform-implementation/144003-obama-budget-retains-part-of-health-reforms-1099-tax-
reporting-requirement (noting that, even after momentum for repeal emerged, Obama still 
included some of the 1099 rule in his 2011 budget). 
 180. N.C. Aizenman, Health-Care Funding Provision Could Face Repeal, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 29, 2010, at A4 (“[The provision] was projected to raise $17.1 billion over 10 years 
toward the cost of the health-care law. . . .  [I]n the spring of 2009, as Baucus and others 
were looking for ways to offset the cost of the health-care bill, the 1099 provision offered a 
ready answer.”). 
 181. Cf. Friebel v. Paradise Shores of Bay Cnty., LLC, No. 5:10-cv-120, 2011 WL 
500001 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2011) (“This is a run-of-the-mill buyers’ remorse case, where the 
Plaintiffs are unsatisfied with the condition of their recently purchased condominium unit.”). 
 182. Aizenman, supra note 180 (“[A]fter the new law was adopted, as business groups 
started holding meetings to tease out the practical implications, . . . the outcry over the 1099 
provision erupted.”). 
 183. E.g., Press Release, Congressman Mike Pence, Pence Supports Repeal of 1099 
Section of Obamacare and Onerous Reporting Requirements (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://mikepence.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4517&Itemid=
55 (“Repealing the onerous 1099 requirement from Obamacare is a victory for Hoosier 
families, small businesses and family farms, as it will cut bureaucratic red tape and foster job 
creation.”). 
 184. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2011 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 47 (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 185. Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy 
Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, § 4, 125 Stat. 36, 36–37. 
 186. The repeal was ultimately made revenue neutral by “forcing greater repayment of 
health insurance subsidies for families whose income unexpectedly exceeds certain 
thresholds.” Felicia Sonmez, Obama Signs Repeal of Health Care Law’s ‘1099’ Tax 
Reporting Rule, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
2chambers/post/obama-signs-1099-repeal-into-law-marking-first-repeal-of-national-health-
care-law-provision/2011/04/14/AFRhYjeD_blog.html; see also Comprehensive 1099 
Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011 § 4, 
125 Stat. at 36–37. 
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Afterwards, once the deed was done, the bill became recast as yet another 
example of unnecessary bureaucratic red tape. 
This pointless exercise of enactment and repeal occurred, basically, 
because no good method exists for pinpointing an acceptable level of 
diffuse administrative burdens for a federal statute to impose upon 
taxpayers to be worth a full $20 billion in federal revenues already owed.  
This example was chosen because it was a simple case where the law’s 
fiscal benefits were knowable.  If the benefits of the law were less readily 
quantifiable and more contested—say, a law to reduce greenhouse gas 
production by home air-conditioners—or the costs of the law were morally 
irrelevant to its proponents—say, a law to eliminate employment 
discrimination against gays and lesbians—one would be even farther out at 
sea. 
In short, the argument from costs presupposes that general answers exist 
to the thorny questions of who should pay for federal law and how much 
they should pay.  Only the answers to these questions would equip us to 
announce that, as a general matter, federal statutory law costs too much.  
But no such answers exist. 
2.  The Argument from Regulatory Costs 
While many of the above arguments apply with equal force to federal 
regulations, the picture is in some respects importantly different where 
federal regulations are involved.  A congressionally imposed mandate 
requires that many regulations’ net benefits exceed their net costs.187  Thus, 
cost-benefit calculations are routinely applied to enormous swaths of the 
regulatory state,188 despite the inherent difficulty of selecting appropriate 
metrics for measuring the attributes of costs and benefits.189
The results of this analysis ought to be heartening.  Many individual rules 
have net positive cost-benefit analyses, as does the system as a whole.
 
190
 
 187. See Sunstein, supra note 
  If 
175, at 1657 (describing OMB’s “full accounting of the 
costs and benefits of all regulation”). 
 188. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE:  THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION, at ix (2002) (The “American government is becoming a cost-benefit state” and 
“government regulation is increasingly assessed by asking whether the benefits of regulation 
justify the costs of regulation”). 
 189. Sunstein, supra note 70, at 488 (“There is no uncontroversial metric with which to 
measure social costs and social benefits.”).  Cost-benefit accountings have a difficult time 
quantifying expressive and other intangible benefits of laws, such as ideals of justice, 
paternalistic motives or ethical constraints.  Consequently, cost-benefit equations often have 
indeterminate outcomes. See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees:  
New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320 (1974) (noting how 
consideration of nonmonetizable values implicates, albeit not uniquely so, the “universal 
difficulty of choosing among incommensurables”). 
 190. On net, the OMB’s numbers indicate that major federal regulations generate annual 
benefits in the aggregate between $132 billion and $655 billion, while the estimated annual 
costs are in the aggregate between $44 billion and $62 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL 
ENTITIES 3, 14 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf. 
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this math can be taken at face value—and there is good reason to think that 
some benefits are understated191—then these numbers should assuage cost-
based fears of regulatory hyperlexis.  But when looking at the subtraction of 
costs from benefits, many critics of hyperlexis insist upon citing only the 
enormous subtrahend of the equation and not the much more enormous 
minuend.192
Such a selective focus has obviously perverse effects.  Rules have 
benefits as well as costs.  Attempting to reduce or cap regulatory costs 
without paying attention to regulatory benefits is counterproductive.  Such a 
strategy will reliably make the regulatory system worse, not better. 
 
Yet that is precisely what cost-focused critics of regulatory hyperlexis 
propose to do.  For example, Senator Warner’s proposed “pay-go” system 
would require each new rule to be accompanied by a repeal of an existing 
rule that imposed the same cost, even if the new rule created only a slight 
benefit while the old rule created enormous benefits.193  Another senator, 
Republican Susan Collins of Maine, has recently urged enacting a 
regulatory “moratorium” for rules that impose costs over a certain dollar 
threshold—without regard to whether the rule might create correspondingly 
large benefits.194  This proposal would defer the effectiveness of good rules, 
thereby reducing their ultimate utility, while doing nothing to prevent 
inefficient rules from ultimately going into effect.  President Obama 
implicitly endorsed such biased logic when in rejecting new smog standards 
he cited the “regulatory burdens” the proposed standards would impose, 
without ever mentioning, let alone questioning, their promised benefits.195
Cost-benefit analysis has well-established constraints and flaws,
 
196
 
 191. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1266 (2006) (noting the concern that in OIRA review 
“regulatory benefits would be systematically undervalued”); Parker, supra note 
 but 
no matter how severe these problems may be, cost-benefit analysis is more 
30, at 1355 
(demonstrating that oft-cited “regulatory scorecards” “grossly underestimate the value of 
lives saved, or the number of lives saved, or both”). But see Robert W. Hahn, The Economic 
Analysis of Regulation:  A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1026–27, 1029–
30 (2004) (disagreeing with Parker and arguing that the benefit of saving future lives should 
be discounted); Sunstein, supra note 175, at 1657 (“While the government’s own numbers 
should be discounted—agency accounts may well be self-serving—at least they provide a 
good place to start.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721–22 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting the fact that “‘over $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public sectors 
obtaining wetlands permits,’” but not quoting any information about the corresponding 
benefits); CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 2; infra notes 193–98.  For an anecdotal analysis of 
the costs of land-use and housing assistance programs, see Ellickson, supra note 98, at 110–
12. 
 193. See Testimony of Mark Warner, supra note 47. 
 194. See Susan Collins, Op-Ed., The Economy Needs a Regulation Time Out, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 26, 2011, at A15. 
 195. See Statement on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 2011 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 607 (Sept. 2, 2011).  For the EPA’s assessment of the benefits of the 
proposed rule, see EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, FINAL NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARD FOR OZONE 7, 8 figs.S1.1 & S1.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/201107_OMBdraft-OzoneRIA.pdf. 
 196. See supra note 189. 
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intellectually coherent and useful than simply “cost” analysis.  The 
analytical engine driving regulatory reform cannot be cost analysis rather 
than cost-benefit analysis.  Sticker shock is simply not an adequate 
substitute for a reasoned analysis of whether a rule is worthwhile.197
A separate word needs to be said about a more nuanced form of the 
argument from costs:  a retail, or “mundane,”
 
198
Here, at last, we see a metric for identifying the existence of “too much” 
law and a goal plausibly linked to that metric.  And as far as it goes, this 
approach is hard to fault.
 version, which contends 
not that cost itself is objectionable in absolute terms, but rather that some 
identifiable subset of regulations are, to borrow a conventional formulation, 
“excessively burdensome” and ought to be eliminated.  This is, in effect, an 
argument that the cost-benefit calculation for particular rules indicates that 
costs outweigh benefits, and that the system should at least be cleansed of 
those laws. 
199
Earlier forays at culling unnecessary regulations from the federal system 
have failed to produce much return on the efforts invested.  “[T]here has 
been no shortage of initiatives to cull regulations” at the federal level and 
even at the state level.
  The question, then, is how far this approach 
actually goes toward achieving the world desired by critics of the costs of 
federal law. 
200  But these initiatives are beset by difficulties, 
including scarce agency resources,201 legal restraints on agency action,202
 
 197. For an example of a sticker shock argument at work, see Collins, supra note 
 
194 
(“[T]he Environmental Protection Agency proposed a new rule on fossil-fuel emissions from 
boilers that—by the EPA’s own admission—would cost the private sector billions of dollars 
and thousands of jobs.”).  Senator Collins does not mention that “by the EPA’s own 
admission,” the new rule would also produce offsetting benefits, including benefits to the 
private sector, that exceed those private-sector costs.  For another example, see HUSAK, 
supra note 95, at 7 (“The cost of federal and state prisons in 2003 was over $185 billion.  
When the collateral costs on prisoners, their families, and their communities are included in 
the equation, the money expended on our punitive policies is astronomical.  No social benefit 
can justify this staggering expenditure of resources.”).  Here, the “social benefit” being 
discarded out of hand is any social benefit that may be ascribed to imprisoning anyone in 
America for any crime at all.  It must be noted, however, that the arguments developed in 
Professor Husak’s book depend only to a minor extent, if at all, upon the economic costs of 
criminal law. 
 198. Sunstein, supra note 175, at 1660 (describing the need for “a more mundane search 
for pragmatic instruments designed to reduce three central problems:  poor priority setting, 
excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side-effects of regulation”). 
 199. There might be strong counterarguments to, for example, the executive branch’s 
deployment of cost-benefit analysis in a manner that nullified congressional intent or express 
instruction. See Sunstein, supra note 173, at 1279 (noting the serious separation of powers 
problems that would be raised by the Executive’s refusal to enforce a properly enacted 
statute on cost-benefit analysis grounds). 
 200. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 30, at 777. 
 201. Neil R. Eisner & Judith S. Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of Existing Regulations, 
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 148 (1996) (“Excessive time and scarce resources devoted to a 
formal review of all regulations could result in insufficient attention to other regulatory 
needs or statutory mandates.  In some instances, a formal review of all regulations of one 
agency may result in the elimination of several obsolete rules, but may preclude 
consideration of a more important regulatory action.”). 
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and entrenchment of rules in the eyes of the public or of the regulated 
industry.203  Even efforts to deregulate outright have largely foundered.204  
With respect to federal regulation, “the forces of erosion have been 
overwhelmed by the processes of accretion.”205
The new Obama initiative for regulatory reform will likely repeat this 
history.  In compliance with the Obama Order, thirty executive departments 
and agencies have released preliminary plans of regulatory review.
 
206
Some of the steps outlined in the plans have already eliminated hundreds 
of millions of dollars in annual regulatory costs, and over $1 billion in 
savings can be expected in the near future.  Over the coming years, the 
reforms have the potential to eliminate billions of dollars in regulatory 
burdens.
  The 
Administrator of OIRA, Cass Sunstein, testified in June 2011 that: 
207
One billion dollars of avoided costs “in the near future” is not negligible, 
but it is clearly a very small portion of the $62 billion in annual costs 
imposed by federal regulations.
 
208
The point is not that OIRA or the executive agencies lack effort or 
resolve.  The point is that trimming even a tenth of the costs imposed by 
federal regulation would be a massive undertaking—and yet it would 
almost certainly fail to satisfy critics of the costs of federal law, some of 
whom now suggest that federal law may impose trillions in costs rather than 
billions.
 
209
 
 202. Id. at 152.  Ironically, some of the legal constraints identified by agencies are 
measures aimed at combating hyperlexis, such as the Paperwork Reduction Act and 
executive orders requiring agencies not to infringe upon federalism. 
  In short, agencies may respond energetically to the mundane 
argument from costs, but their efforts will leave untouched the vast bulk of 
 203. Id. at 153–54. 
 204. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 30, at 778–79 (“While the Reagan administration had a 
reputation for deregulation, over two terms it ended only four regulatory 
programs. . . .  ‘[T]he [first] Bush administration tried to get rid of 246 small items (most of 
them not full-scale programs but projects and grants and the like) and speared only eight.  
President Clinton’s hard-won 1993 budget deal managed to eliminate only forty-one small 
programs . . . .’  The Republican-controlled 105th Congress did not fare much better, 
terminating about 200 programs and agencies that accounted for only one-quarter of one 
percent of the budget.” (second alteration in original) (quoting JONATHAN RAUCH, 
GOVERNMENT’S END:  WHY WASHINGTON STOPPED WORKING 180 (1999))). 
 205. Id. at 782. 
 206. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Prepared 
Testimony Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee 2 (June 3, 2011), available at http://Republicans.
EnergyCommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Oversight/060311/Sunstein.pdf. 
 207. Id. (emphasis added). 
 208. Moreover, the retrospective review process may not be a one-way street to fewer 
rules and lower costs:  Mr. Sunstein has directed agencies to look not only at removing 
regulations but also to “explore how best to evaluate regulations in order to expand on those 
that work (and thus to fill possible gaps).” See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, 
Administrator, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, for the Heads of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, M-11-28, at 4 (July 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-28.pdf.  In the 
meantime, of course, the ordinary process of rulemaking proceeds apace. 
 209. See CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 2, at 2–3; see also Laura Meckler, White House to 
Scale Back Regulations on Businesses, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2011, at A2. 
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regulatory costs—as well as the criticism that considers costs alone to be 
ammunition. 
D.  A Summary 
In what one hopes was a brisk but not unfair fashion, this part offered a 
cross-cutting survey of a considerable amount of legal and policy terrain.  It 
is worthwhile to assess some intermediate conclusions at this point. 
The discussion in this part categorized and criticized the most common 
theories of federal hyperlexis.  The argument from numerosity, in its naked 
form, suffers from the lack of a meaningful normative baseline.  The 
argument from complexity suffers from the same flaw; in addition, no good 
method exists for meaningfully reducing complexity in law.  The arguments 
from federalism and over-delegation rest upon questionable assumptions 
about the likely results of correcting the constitutional flaws they assert.  
The argument from costs is difficult to apply to federal statutes, because of 
the absence of a theoretical yardstick for determining what a statute, let 
alone the aggregate of all federal statutes, ought to cost.  The cost argument 
makes little sense when it measures only costs and not benefits, and the 
project of looking for and repealing non-cost-effective regulations is 
unlikely to make a meaningful dent in the corpus of federal law—or at least, 
a dent meaningful to those who deplore the cost of federal law. 
A practical point about these arguments will not have escaped the 
reader’s notice:  many of the accounts of hyperlexis are mutually 
incompatible.  For example, imposing procedural checks upon any 
regulation that exceeds a certain cost threshold will encourage the 
multiplication of regulations that do not exceed that threshold.  Requiring 
Congress to specify its policy goals with greater precision when it delegates 
authority will produce increases in statutory complexity and numerosity.  
Reducing reliance upon federal regulatory schemes, as Professor Brown has 
argued, may encourage the proliferation of federal criminal laws.210
If critiques of hyperlexis are difficult to operationalize individually, their 
crosscutting ramifications make them impossible to operationalize in 
concert.  Like the weather, hyperlexis is something that everyone talks 
about but nobody can do anything about. 
 
III.  RAMIFICATIONS OF THE HYPERLEXIS CRITIQUE 
Talk of hyperlexis and talk of the weather share more in common than 
the similarity just mentioned.  Metaphors used to describe hyperlexis in law 
reliably evoke the imagery of weather, particularly floods, tidal waves, 
tsunamis, and other uncontrollable watery phenomena.211
 
 210. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 664–65 (2011) (“In significant part, I suggest, federal criminal law 
is so expansive because ideological support for the federal regulatory state is comparatively 
thin.”). 
  In comparison, 
 211. See supra notes 1, 6.  Bayless Manning’s initial article on hyperlexis is a notable 
exception. See Manning, supra note 8, at 767. 
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complaints about the prevalence of frivolous civil litigation tend to borrow 
the imagery of infection and illness, treating America’s litigiousness as a 
national disease or “epidemic.”212
This is mildly ironic, because the reasons why there is more and more 
law lie, almost by definition, within human control.  “[T]he most plausible 
theoretical and empirical explanations [for growth in government] tend to 
focus on changes in constituent demand for government-provided goods 
and services.  For example, population growth, industrialization, and 
international trade have increased demand for various kinds of economic 
regulation, while progressive social movements have led to greater demand 
for government redistribution and welfare.”
  But the idea of disease, even epidemic 
disease, holds within it at least the hope of cure.  The imagery of weather, 
on the other hand, reflects a tacit claim that the phenomenon described lies 
beyond human control. 
213  In short, government power 
has grown, at least in part, “because officials are responsive to constituent 
demands for more government.”214
Consider federal criminal law.  Is its expansion (assuming it has 
meaningfully expanded) consistent with or contrary to democratic 
preference?  Professor William Stuntz argues that the system of criminal 
liability “will always be broader than ordinary majoritarian politics would 
suggest, and the tendency will always—or at least until something in the 
lawmaking process changes—be toward more breadth.”
 
215  But though 
Professor Stuntz points to some symptoms of misalignment between 
“ordinary majoritarian politics” and the breadth of criminal codes,216 his 
explanation for the proliferation of criminal laws—“[a] deeper 
politics . . . of institutional competition and cooperation” based on the 
interaction between prosecutors, legislatures, and judges217
 
 212. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform:  Miscasting 
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (noting “the perennially 
popular assertion that the United States is experiencing an escalating epidemic of litigation 
and has become ‘the world’s most litigious nation’”). 
—is not 
necessarily counter-majoritarian.  Professor Stuntz admits that voter 
 213. Levinson, supra note 147, at 936. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Stuntz, supra note 119, at 528–29. 
 216. Stuntz argues that majoritarian politics alone should not “produce broad criminal 
codes that cover a range of ordinary, fairly innocuous behavior.” Id. at 509; see also id. at 
524–25 (arguing that expansiveness of federal mail and wire fraud statutes targets 
“borderline dishonesty by middle-class offenders . . . the last thing any popularly elected 
legislature would want to criminalize”).  In addition, if the criminal code responds to 
majoritarian pressures, it would be expected only to expand when criminal activity is higher 
and more politically salient. See id. at 509 (noting that the criminal code has been expanding 
since the mid-1800s despite wide variance in the political salience of crime).  He also notes 
that new criminal statutes should target the crime that is rising.  For instance, a rise in street 
and drug crime and increased public concern about street and drug crime should not have 
resulted in new federal offenses that targeted the Mafia and political corruption. See id. at 
525.  Finally, the expansion of the criminal code should occur at the level of enforcement.  
Because the street and drug crime is enforced at the state level, new federal offenses of any 
kind are off-base. See id. (“[T]he changes should have been in state codes, not the federal 
code.”). 
 217. Id. at 510. 
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pressure is often the cause of the governmental dynamics that ratchet up 
criminal law.218  For instance, legislatures fear being blamed by a 
prosecutor if a wrongdoer escapes because the law was drafted too 
narrowly.219  Prosecutors push for more prosecuting tools because the “the 
public seeks” both prosecutions and convictions, but the democratic process 
puts prosecutors on a budget.220  Similarly, courts may endorse ambitious 
interpretations of criminal law because they fear that politicians may 
supersede their decisions.221  Just because competition and cooperation 
between prosecutors and legislatures produces more criminal law than 
Professor Stuntz might expect, then, does not mean that the outcome is one 
that a majority of the public does not like.  The continual public pressure on 
legislatures and prosecutors to expand criminal law may signal public 
endorsement of the results of this deeper politics.222  Indeed, if public 
demand is the correct yardstick to measure the excess of criminal law, one 
might conclude that there is, if anything, too little federal criminal law.223
What can one make of the democratic provenance of hyperlexis?  To the 
extent that hyperlexis is the proper product of democratic choice, expressed 
through constitutional mechanisms, it may be entitled to at least some 
legitimacy, even if just a faint presumption of it.  If, in contrast, the 
existence of hyperlexis reflected not democracy at work but some pathology 
or failure of democratic process, one might think differently.  But without 
an account of the flaw in the democratic process that generates hyperlexis, 
it is difficult to avoid categorizing the mine-run of complaints of hyperlexis 
as just more instances of failed legislative coalition-building—whether by 
small businesses reluctant to fill out 1099 forms, by corporations who 
dislike spending money on coal-plant retrofitting, or by people who would 
prefer to be able to tear the tags off their mattresses without fear of federal 
charges. 
 
To borrow the rubric set forth in Part II, we require an “argument from 
process” that can convincingly back up the assertion that the quantity of law 
unacceptably surpasses the quantity of law that the American people 
want—or at least deserve.  As described below, however, such an account is 
elusive. 
A.  The Elusive Argument from Process 
For all of the ink spilled upon hyperlexis, little effort has been made to 
trace it to some particular breakdown in the operations of democratic 
 
 218. Id. at 529 (“[C]rime is one of those matters about which most voters care a great 
deal.”). 
 219. Id. at 547–48. 
 220. Id. at 534, 535–38. 
 221. See id. at 562. 
 222. Stuntz admits such a reading is plausible. Id. at 600 (“[T]he way the system has 
evolved is, while certainly not dictated by public opinion, at least consistent with it.”). 
 223. See Baker, supra note 114, at 546 (“The general public, however, has no such 
awareness [of the explosive growth of federal crimes] and, if it did, most would likely not be 
concerned.  Indeed, the continuing political appeal of ‘tough on crime’ policies has been 
driving the growth of federal criminal legislation.”). 
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government.  Are industry interest groups reliably trumping the preferences 
of a broader majority in producing an accretion of self-serving laws?  Or, 
alternatively, are federal bureaucrats routinely succeeding in inflating 
regulatory regimes to pad their budgets, to build their “empires,” or to 
assuage their excessively cautious and risk-averse natures?  Does the 
proliferation of federal laws accord with, or run counter to, the preferences 
of the median American voter?224  And, supposing that those preferences 
were stable and detectable, would a legislator honestly seeking to serve 
democratic values try to implement or strive to override those 
preferences?225
The natural place where one would expect to find the argument from 
process is in the literature on public choice theory.  The vast scholarship in 
this area explains how the political economy of legislatures and agencies 
may result in the production of regulatory regimes that are inconsistent with 
the ends of democratic process and good public policy.
 
226  But public 
choice theory does not offer an explanation of a pathology underpinning the 
systemwide generation of hyperlexis.227
Let us assume the accuracy of the core message of public-choice 
theorists:  that individual self-interest and interest-group pressure sway 
administrative agencies and legislatures to enact laws that do not accord 
with the needs and wishes of the democratic electorate (or, at least, only 
 
 
 224. The evidence is ambiguous. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:  
Against Simple Rules for A Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 999 (1997) 
(“[V]oters through the 1980s relentlessly insisted that they wanted less government and more 
environmental protection.  In the 1990s, we profess a strong commitment to achieving more 
affordable, broadly available health care, yet we simultaneously insist on our desire to retain 
a high degree of individual freedom of choice.”). 
 225. Id. at 1006–07 (“[I]n some measure the test of a legitimate democratic regime is 
whether it ‘gives the people what they want.’  But the test is incomplete because based on 
the incomplete premise that the act of governing is a passive, mechanistic aggregation of 
citizen preferences, the legitimacy of which derives from full and fair counting. . . .  [P]art of 
the legitimate realm of democratic governance is the shaping of values and the forging of 
commitments—and sometimes, the deliberate determination by our representatives to defy 
the will of the people in the interest of the community as a whole, or a vulnerable subsection 
of the community.”). 
 226. Professor Farina’s vivid summary encapsulates the theory’s essential implications 
for the regulatory state: 
Public choice offers a versatile and ambitious explanatory system derived from 
one, simple proposition:  human self-interest.  Citizens act to acquire the biggest 
piece of the collective resource pie at the lowest cost to themselves; legislators act 
to acquire reelection; bureaucrats act to acquire more power (bigger budget, wider 
authority, and so on) while in government and lucrative opportunities via the 
revolving door when they leave.  A single postulated entity, rational man, 
motivated by a single postulated principle, interest maximization, can explain the 
existence of the regulatory universe and account for the various regulatory failures 
that so occupy scholarly and popular attention. 
Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s 
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2000). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). 
 227. See Buzbee, supra note 30, at 37 (“Broad-based concerns about overregulation, in 
the sense of comprehensive regulatory intrusion, actually finds little support in the logic of 
public choice scholarship . . . .”). 
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accidentally accord with them).228  It still remains hard to see why the vast 
and multifarious spectrum of individual and group preferences, channeled 
through the various political-economic configurations of Congress and the 
agencies, and averaged over decades, would reliably result in the net over-
production of federal law.  The preferences of various participants in the 
lawmaking arena will conflict, not cohere, around (for example) whether 
rules should be simple or complex, sparse or detailed.229  Conventional 
accounts of agency capture and special interest behavior run counter to the 
idea that agencies will over-regulate.230  Under-regulation and stasis are 
equally plausible results.231  In short, even if public choice theory sets forth 
accurately the equation by which self-interested preference results in legal 
enactments,232
B.  The Unavoidable Argument from Liberty 
 it is unclear what the integral of that equation might be. 
The lack of an argument from process cannot, however, decisively quell 
the hyperlexis critique.  Claims of hyperlexis draw upon and reflect 
philosophical beliefs about liberty and government that are far too deeply 
rooted to be dispelled by the dry prognostications of public choice theory.  
To adopt again the rubric of Part II, the “argument from liberty” is a 
persistent, unavoidable feature of nearly any debate over hyperlexis. 
The argument from liberty castigates hyperlexis (conceived in various 
ways) for its toxic effects upon liberty (conceived in various ways).  So, for 
example, businesses deplore the constraints upon economic liberty imposed 
by the network of federal rules.233
 
 228. See Farina, supra note 
  Libertarians condemn the threats to 
226, at 110. 
 229. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65, 99–100 (1983) (noting the indeterminate results for rule precision of the competing 
preferences of regulated entities, new entrants to markets, beneficiaries of regulation, and 
consumers). 
 230. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 122 (2000) (“[I]nterest groups do not generally rush to Congress and plead, 
‘Regulate us!’  The impetus for the Clean Air Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
and other such laws was not intensive industry lobbying.  To the contrary, the special interest 
groups tend to resist social regulation and complain about its costly mandates once it is 
passed.”). 
 231. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 191, at 1284 (debunking the idea that public theory 
predicts that agencies will regulate overzealously:  “theories of agency overregulation often 
rest on faulty premises and are in any event no more plausible than alternative theories 
suggesting that agencies will routinely underregulate”); Buzbee, supra note 30, at 41 (“[T]he 
sum of politician and regulator self-interest, combined with industry and not-for-profit 
regulatory demands, will not necessarily result in onerous regulation, or any regulation at 
all.”). 
 232. It might not. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:  A 
Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 67–68 (1990) (criticizing public choice writing “particularly from law schools” as 
“falsif[ying] not only human nature, but observable facts about the legislative process,” 
“[f]lattening and minimizing the roles of politicians and unorganized voters, and overlooking 
empirical evidence that could be found through a simple library search”). 
 233. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, Regulations Devastate Economic Growth, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/
regulations-devastate-economic-growth (arguing that regulations threaten “free enterprise”). 
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liberty of holding innocent citizens accountable to a complex web of 
criminal and civil prohibitions.234  The encroachment of federal law is 
characterized as imperiling the safeguards for individual liberty crafted into 
the federalist system of government.235
The argument from liberty has close ties to arguments against “big 
government,” an idea that itself has a venerable pedigree in American 
thought.  “Fear and loathing of big and growing government has been a 
persistent theme in American political and constitutional discourse since the 
Founding.”
  These and other versions of the 
“argument from liberty” are both the culmination of, and the motivating 
force behind, the critiques of hyperlexis taxonomized above. 
236  In this larger narrative, the amount of federal law is just 
another yardstick with which to measure the encroaching shadow of the 
Leviathan.  And each day seems to show that more and more Americans are 
wary of Leviathan and the laws it wields.  The percentage of Americans 
who mistrust public institutions is at historical highs.237  Approval of 
Congress has dropped into the single digits on one poll,238 and remains 
stuck at record lows in the 13 to 15 percent range in another poll.239  Only 
one in ten Americans say that they can “always or most of the time” “trust 
the government in Washington to do what is right.”240  The low levels of 
approval do not vary across party.241
It is no surprise that wide-scale deterioration of trust in federal 
institutions and officials would correlate closely with an uptick in concern 
that the federal government is creating too much law.  And one can safely 
assume that at least Congress and the President, and perhaps even the 
federal judiciary, are responding to the prevailing popular sense that there is 
too much law when they decry federal hyperlexis in public statements, bills, 
hearings, executive orders, and opinions.  These endorsements of the 
hyperlexis narrative may themselves encourage the perpetuation and 
entrenchment of the narrative.  When the men and women responsible for 
running the modern administrative state criticize its rules, decry its costs, 
and bemoan its complexity, the public at large is more likely to credit those 
concerns.  Talk of hyperlexis by those in the top echelons of government 
thus both feeds and feeds upon popular sentiment. 
 
It is probably impossible to pinpoint whether mistrust of government is 
driving mistrust of law, whether mistrust of law is driving mistrust of 
government, or whether the causal arrows flow in both directions.  “[T]he 
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problem with thinking about the role of ideas is that they cannot readily be 
modeled or predicted.”242
C.  Leviathan and Legitimacy 
  But perhaps one prediction can safely be 
ventured:  as long as there are laws to count, the argument from liberty will 
continue to be levied against federal legislators and regulators. 
How might federal institutions be affected by the prominence and the 
permanence of the hyperlexis critique (and the argument from liberty that 
leverages that critique)?  The chief challenge of the idea of “too much law” 
is that, as we have seen, it is easy to state but hard to operationalize.  From 
the perspective of the public, the consequence is a large and unbridgeable 
gap between what is loudly declared both possible and necessary, and what 
is actually achieved. 
This gap has one notable consequence from which many others flow:  
injury to what Professor Richard Fallon has called the sociological 
legitimacy of law.243  As Professor Fallon notes, “administrative agencies 
are widely believed to face a serious, even alarming, sociological legitimacy 
deficit.”244
A mismatch exists between existing theories of legal legitimacy and the 
sort of theory that would be necessary to rebut effectively the legitimacy 
challenge represented by the hyperlexis critique.  Consider the legitimacy of 
federal statutes.  Various theorists have come up with differing accounts of 
the sources of legitimacy of statutes.  The leading accounts state that a 
statute’s legitimacy comes from some combination of the following:  
compliance with the formal rules that authorize its creation;
  But not very far down the road, one can perceive a world where 
the chronic legitimacy crisis that for decades has afflicted the federal 
administrative state has spread to all of federal law, statutory or regulatory. 
245 the fact that 
the group that enacted it has been democratically elected;246 and/or the 
pluralistic deliberative process through which it is created.247
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  It is obvious 
that these legitimating mechanisms are oriented towards and validate the 
232, at 100. 
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source of statutory law.  They do not attempt to legitimate the “back end” 
or upshot of lawmaking—the aggregate volume or growth of law—because 
they assume that the legitimacy of each discrete part is enough to establish 
the legitimacy of the aggregate whole. 
Theories (or “models”) of legitimacy applicable to federal regulations 
show the same skew in their orientation.  Chief among these theories are the 
presidential control model;248 technocratic expertise model;249 and the 
interest group representation or pluralistic democracy model.250  A civic 
republican model has also been proposed,251 as well as a model that focuses 
on reducing arbitrariness rather than upon enhancing accountability in 
administrative action.252
The calls for legislative minimalism that are today ubiquitous prove that 
this assumption has been naive.  The whole of American law is, somehow, 
less legitimate than the sum of its parts. 
  All of these models ground regulatory law’s 
legitimacy in the existence of safeguards on the means by which regulatory 
law is produced—whether those safeguards are the democratic 
accountability of executive branch actors, procedural protections against 
arbitrariness, availability of judicial review, or other mechanisms.  Like the 
theories of statutory legitimacy canvassed above, theories of administrative 
legitimacy assume that once agency action can be defended as legitimate, 
the collected results of that action shall also be deemed legitimate. 
How does this reduction of law’s sociological legitimacy make itself felt?  
Various types of harm might result.  Erosion of sociological legitimacy may 
result in a reduced acceptance of the authoritative legal legitimacy of the 
laws—i.e., their legally binding nature.253  Individuals and entities might 
disobey particular laws or regulatory schemes regarded as especially 
illegitimate.  The perception that particular laws are being disobeyed might 
metastasize into a wider-scale disobedience to law more generally.254
Generalized distrust and skepticism of regulatory and legislative action 
also has more immediate and pragmatic consequences.  Such skepticism 
“affects the form, and more importantly, the efficacy of regulatory regimes 
including critical ancillary decisions such as funding and staffing of 
enforcement offices.”
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  Moreover, this dynamic has the propensity to 
compound itself.  Distorting legal regimes to accommodate skepticism of 
law can itself generate skepticism of such regimes. 
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For a concrete example of this feedback loop in operation, witness the 
structure and implementation of PPACA.  To accommodate concerns about 
the impact upon insurers and state governments of new federal rules 
governing health insurance, the statute authorized certain provisions of 
PPACA to be implemented in an incremental manner.256  Federal agencies 
used this statutory authority to defer, or “waive,” the application of rules 
promulgated pursuant to PPACA for hundreds of entities.257  The resulting 
patchwork regime—dubbed “government by waiver”—drew sharp criticism 
from some quarters on the grounds that such a system unjustly rewards the 
politically well-connected and savvy.258
Another example comes from the creation of the Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal agency with authority to regulate 
consumer financial transactions.  Due in large part to congressional 
wariness of creating new regulations, the administration was unable to 
obtain Senate confirmation of its first choice to head the CFPB.
 
259  The 
result was that a powerful new federal agency came into being under the 
direction of a person who officially had no power over it and is now being 
run by an unconfirmed appointee.  The question here is not who bears the 
political blame for this situation.  The point is that congressional resistance 
to issuance of new federal rules has had the collateral consequence of 
reducing the CFPB’s democratic accountability and thus its legitimacy.260
A final example comes from the anemic response by federal prosecutors 
with respect to the 2008 mortgage crisis.  The Department of Justice has 
declined to pursue criminal sanctions of many firms and individuals 
implicated in the crisis.
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traction that complaints about over-criminalization have enjoyed among 
powerful members of the federal criminal bar, particularly with respect to 
corporate criminal law.262  The absence of criminal accountability has 
produced nationwide public outcries.263  Likewise, the leniency with which 
the federal government, through the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
has enforced civil fraud sanctions against Wall Street banks and their 
employees has provoked a stinging rebuke from one distinguished jurist.264
In all of these instances, the stature of federal law and federal institutions 
may ultimately have suffered injury due to attempts by federal actors to 
heed the call to legislative minimalism.  Such dynamics will probably recur 
in the future, as the hyperlexis critique and calls to legislative minimalism 
intensify, and efforts to accommodate these ideas continue to backfire.  
When the hyperlexis critique constrains or hampers the government’s 
ability to act, the federal government’s capacity for addressing genuine 
problems is reduced—which takes the first turn down a spiral of 
incompetence that only further undermines confidence in government and 
in law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
  Moves on:  nor all thy Piety nor Wit 
  Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
  Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. 
  Omar Khayyám265
Much of this Article’s message is not reassuring; it is, more or less, a 
counsel of despair.  The critics of federal hyperlexis—and who among us 
has not at some point wished for less federal law?—lack the Wit to erase a 
meaningful amount of what the Moving Finger of federal lawmaking has 
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writ, and the Piety to realize their impotence.  What they do not lack are 
Tears.  Mourning over the proliferation of law has become a popular 
pastime, and one that has recruited ardent enthusiasts from both parties and 
from the top reaches of the federal government. 
This Article has sketched the chief contours of the hyperlexis critique and 
has shown how it interacts with various legal and policy debates that are 
conventionally regarded as distinct and unrelated.  This critique, and the 
concept of legislative minimalism, will not soon fade from public discourse.  
Legislators and theorists must grapple both with these concepts and with the 
ramifications that their currency might have upon the legitimacy of federal 
law. 
